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Introduction 
‘If you end the oil supply, the motor stops… But if you stop the water supply, life stops.’  
(Turkish minister of state)2  
 
4500 years ago the nations of Umma and Lagash went to war over water. The access to the 
river Euphrates was of such economic importance, that war erupted between them over how 
to divide the fresh water running through both states. The nations believed that only a war 
could solve the conflicting economic interests.34 The example of Umma and Lagash highlights 
the high value ascribed to water. If a nation is prepared to go to war to have access to water, 
the resource is valuable. With the world facing a growing fresh water scarcity, will people start 
fighting to have access to the scarce water resources of the planet? 
 
Water has always been a vital necessity for human life. We need to drink water to survive, our 
cattle, our crops and hygiene systems require it. Regions that have abundant fresh water have 
the opportunity to develop their agriculture and economy without having to worry whether 
water scarcity might hamper growth, production or human welfare. But in water scarce 
countries the government has to decide how to distribute the small amount of water across the 
population. If you have only one liter of water, do you decide to drink it, feed it to your cattle, 
irrigate your land, use it in industrial production or do you generate electricity with it? Some 
parts of countries like the United States, Sudan, Spain and China are extremely arid. Faced with 
scarcity the distribution decisions the government makes, or does not make, are of vital 
importance to the population. In rapidly industrializing China, the choice between irrigating the 
rice fields, providing for industrial output or delivering water to the growing urban population is 
a question that is increasingly faced by government officials and water managers. If the 
government of China decides to divert the water to the citizens of Beijing instead of irrigating 
the rice paddies of rural farmers, then what will the farmers do? When threatened in their 
                                                 
2
 Neda A. Zawahri, ‘International rivers and national security: The Euphrates, Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indus, Tigris, 
and Yarmouk rivers’, National Resources Forum 32 (2008) 280-289, 284. 
3
 Juha I Uitto and Aaron Wolf, ‘Water Wars? Geographical perspectives: introduction’, The Geographical Journal 
168:4 (2002) 289-292, 289. 
4
 Sandra L. Postel and Aaron T. Wolf, ‘Dehydrating conflict’, Foreign Policy (September/October 2001) 2-9, 2. 
4 | P a g e  
 
livelihoods, will they decide to fight the government of China, just as Umma and Lagash decided 
to fight each other?  
Growing demand or declining availability of water makes distribution decisions based on water 
scarcity an increasingly acute problem across the globe. Because policy makers are facing 
distribution decisions, the academic community (economists, social scientists and historians) is 
devoting a growing amount of time and attention to what the consequences of these scarcity-
motivated decisions will be. In my research, I will focus on the question whether water scarcity 
can lead to conflict. To investigate how water and conflict are connected I use two theories 
which are the most relevant when dealing with the connection between water and conflict.  
The first theory is called the Water Wars theory. Research into water scarcity has led to a 
theory which states that water scarcity can lead to conflict, as people start fighting to grab 
access to a vital resource.5 The war between the two ancient Mesopotamian states is a prime 
example of how a water war can occur. The nations shared a water resource and both were 
powerful states that economically depended on the access to that water resource. This clash of 
interests led to conflict and a water war was born. As there was no other source of fresh water 
than the Euphrates water scarcity eventually led to this conflict.6  Simply put the basic 
assumption of the Water Wars thesis is Neo-Malthusian in nature.7 The world has a limited 
amount of water and the amount of water per person is on the decline globally. In 1800 there 
was 40.000m³ of fresh water available per capita; in 2025 the amount of water per person is 
expected to have fallen to 4.962 m³. According to Water War theory, the fact that water is 
becoming scarcer will eventually mean that countries and groups in societies will clash with 
each other in order to protect the water supply of their population or interest group.8 Thus 
water scarcity will lead to conflict.  
Although Water War theory is specifically designed to research water scarcity conflict, there 
also exists a broad body of literature based on how all natural resources can lead to conflict. 
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These studies are based on the Resource Curse thesis. Resource Curse is an economic theory 
which states that countries with abundant natural resources have relatively smaller economic 
growth than resource-poor countries.9 As conflicts have a negative effect on economic growth, 
internal and external conflicts are part of the theoretical framework of the Resource Curse 
thesis. Studies investigating the relationship between natural resources and conflict revealed 
various mechanisms behind resource driven conflicts.10 The causes and factors contributing to 
the outbreak of resource conflicts differ depending on the societal position of the groups 
having a clash of interests, the individual, group, economic position and societal level matter for 
the reasons behind turning to violence. A government has different reasons for turning to 
conflict than a farmer. But the causes and factors behind the way all these groups act can be 
summarized as greed or grievance driven.11 For example, if local elites are consuming vast 
amounts of luxury import products while the mass of the population is bereft of even the bare 
necessities for survival, this will lead to grievances with the marginalized groups in society. 
Elites in resource rich societies have the tendency to use the resources to provide income for 
themselves instead of using the resource income for investments in society that will stimulate 
the economy. This is called the “looting of resources”. This greed for resource income leads to 
grievances with other groups in society. An important factor in resource driven conflict is 
therefore how elites deal with the income natural resources generate.12 How different interests 
groups in society act and the reasons behind their actions are investigated by studies about 
resources and conflict.  
The theoretical framework provided by the Resource Curse thesis for studying resource 
conflicts has so far not been applied to water conflicts. In my thesis I want to combine Water 
War theory with Resource Curse theory. This allows us to look into Water Wars using the 
methods and analysis tools provided by Resource Curse thesis. Although war over water seems 
                                                 
9
 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, ‘Natural resource abundance and economic growth’, National Bureau of 
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like a logical outcome of water scarcity, the theory is not exclusively accepted. Amongst 
scholars there remains a lot of doubt and discussion about the theory. In fact, the war between 
Umma and Lagash 4500 years ago was the last war where water was the driver of the conflict. 
So one may wonder if conflicts driven by water scarcity, are a viable cause for interstate war or 
local conflict. There does not seem to be evidence, which shows that water scarcity actually 
leads to conflict.13 By using the framework provided by Resource Curse I hope to discover if 
water scarcity actually can lead to conflict. Literature about resource conflicts identifies several 
internal conflicts in which water was considered a factor for the outbreak of that conflict. My 
research therefore focuses on two cases in which water is said to have been a contributing 
factor for the outbreak of the conflicts.  
My hypothesis is: water scarcity can lead to conflict as elites try and divert the scarce resource 
away to the most easily lootable production method. The water distribution decisions an elite 
group makes are not based on independent grounds or the general interest of a nation, but are 
the result of the selfish goals of that group. Looting in this context means that the resource 
income is not used for public investments but used for personal gains. Groups in society that 
lose water because of the diversion of the elite have no other option to express their grievances 
than getting into conflict with the elite. This research question derives from combining the 
ideas from Resource Curse Thesis and Water Wars. First, from Water Wars, I use the 
assumption that water scarcity will lead to conflict. Second, from Resource Curse thesis, I use 
the academic framework for investigating resource driven conflict. Finally, I use the outcome of 
various studies into resources and conflict that stipulate that greedy income seeking elites lead 
to grievances in society; more explicitly greed and grievance lead to conflicts within societies.14  
 
To test this hypothesis I investigate two cases; the Darfur conflict and the Chinese 
environmental conflicts. The Darfur conflict is a full scale war between a rebel movement and 
the central government in which water scarcity is said to be one of the driving forces of the 
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rebel movement.15 For my second case, I chose China because water conflicts are said to break 
out all over the country.16 The conflicts in China can be small protests against the government 
or clashes between different societal groups which have different water priorities. Fact is that 
in China, conflicts are breaking out and water is named a factor for these conflicts to erupt. So 
the first reason to choose both cases is because water conflicts are said to occur in both nations. 
The second reason to choose these cases is because they can be contrasted against each other. 
For example, the sort of water conflict differs; in Darfur a civil war took place and in China the 
conflict takes the shape of small local protests. Another example, China is on the rise 
economically and is developing its industrial complex at a fast rate. Darfur is economically stale 
and has almost no export or economical surplus. Because the economic, political and societal 
factors in China and Darfur differ to a great extent, the outcome of my case studies hopefully 
says something about water conflicts in general and not only on these particular cases. By 
comparing and contrasting these cases I hope to conclude if the Resource Curse framework is 
applicable to water conflict. I hope to find regularity behind water driven resource conflict.  
My thesis will be structured as follows. To ensure the reader is fully acquainted with the 
economic and environmental position of fresh water I provide the reader with a more extensive 
political-economic study of water in the first chapter. In the second chapter I give a more 
thorough explanation of the Water War, Resource Curse and Scarcity theory so the reader is 
fully informed of the theoretical background of my two case studies. At the end of chapter 2, I 
also give a more elaborate version of my hypothesis in order to provide a more comprehensive 
overview of the theories which form the theoretical framework of my research. Subsequently in 
chapter three, I look into the role water played in the Darfur conflict. And in chapter four, I 
examine how water conflicts in China develop and sometimes turn violent. In my conclusion, I 
will give my vision on how water can play a role in the development of conflicts. 
                                                 
15
 Alex de Waal, ‘Is climate change the culprit for Darfur?’. June 2007. http://africanarguments.org/2007/06/25/is-
climate-change-the-culprit-for-darfur/ (12 augustus 2011).  
16
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1. Water  
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the role of water in politics and economics. I will 
discuss how water is used, will be used in the future and what the difficulties facing water 
managers are. When discussing water scarcity and the consequences of water scarcity, it is 
illuminating to have an overview of how one must consider water in an economical and political 
context. How do you value water and can it be treated as an economic resource? 
 
1.2 Present, Future and Trends in Water Use 
Fresh water is a scarce and rare commodity compared to all the non-usable water in the world, 
97,4% of the water in the world is salt ocean water, almost 2% of worldwide water is contained 
in Ice caps and glaciers, which leaves 0,6% of all worldwide water in the hydrological cycle.17 
Fresh water is the only water that is taken into account when discussing water resources.18   
Humans use fresh water foremost for agriculture (89%). Reservoirs (6%), industry (3%) and 
municipal waters (2%) are the other large fresh water consumers.19 The overall expectation is 
that fresh water will be more in demand in the future. First, the earth is faced with a growing 
human population; the United Nations estimates that in 2050 the world will be populated by 
9,3 billion people, compared to 6,9 billion in 2010.20 Those people not only need to drink water, 
they also need to be fed. As shown in the statistics above, water is vital for agriculture. Next to 
the human, livestock and agricultural demand, the growing population will also increase 
industrial product consumption. To keep up with demand for products, the industrial sector will 
also need more water.21 Second, the world is confronted with countries that are developing 
                                                 
17
 J.A. Allen, The Middle East water question, hydropolitics and the global economy (Londen and New York 2002) 
114-116. 
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 Allen, The Middle East water question, 116. 
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 Leif Ohlsson, Hydropolitics,conflict over water as a development constraint (Londen 1995) 7-10. 
20
 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,   
‘World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision’. 3 May 2011. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm 
(8 October 2011). 
21
 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (henceforth ESCWA), Water scarcity in the 
Arab world, Population and development report, first issue (New York 2003) 11. 
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quickly; China, Brazil, India and Russia are on the rise economically. Simultaneously with their 
economic growth, their water consumption will rise. The wealthier a nation is, the more its 
population is consuming and in the end all the products people consume cost water. For 
example, the wealthier a person gets, the more meat he or she eats. The production of a 
kilogram of potatoes costs 500 liters of water, whereas the production of a kilogram of beef 
requires 15.000 liters. To provide the world with the lifestyle the global population demands, 
the availability of water is vital.22 Third, climate change will cause additional water stress. 
Scientists predict that the world is becoming warmer. With the rise of temperatures, sea levels 
will rise and areas of the world will become more often affected by drought. Part of the 
population of the world relies on glacier melt water for its fresh water supply. With the melting 
of glaciers, this fresh water source will dry up eventually.23 Decreased rainfall and rising 
temperatures will increase the amount of farmland that depends on irrigation to sustain 
cultivation. So the changing world climate will make fresh water an even scarcer and more 
needed commodity than it already is.  
Due to the reasons listed above, the world is faced with growing water demand while the fresh 
water availability is in decline. However, this growing scarcity does not mean that we will 
eventually run out of water. Countries still have the possibility to choose for technological and 
institutional rearrangements which will enlarge the available water supply. The options are 
reducing the demand for water, enlarging the supply of water and treating water more as an 
economical resource which makes trade and cooperation a more feasible possibility.24 In this 
paragraph I will treat the subject of the reduction and enlargement of the water supply, in the 
next paragraph I will deal with water as an economic resource.   
Countries can prevent the waste of water by improving existing technological systems or by 
switching to new technology. Half of the water used in the water system of the Jordanian 
capital Amman is not available for consumption by inhabitants of the city. This water is lost, due 
to leaks, evaporation and illegal pipeline connections. If the government would invest in the 
                                                 
22
 Bernice Lee, ‘Managing the interlocking climate and resource challenges’, International affairs 85:6 (2009) 1101-
1116, 1105. 
23
 Lee, ‘Managing the interlocking climate’, 1106. 
24
 Aaron T. Wolf, Hydropolitics along the Jordan river (Tokyo 1995) 130-131. 
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repair of the water system the city would safe a vast amount of water.25 An example of a 
technological improvement is drip irrigation; which leads water through pipes to the roots of 
plants. In contrast, flood irrigation which is the most used irrigation method causes a lot of 
water to evaporate before it is consumed by plants. Investing in drip irrigation prevents these 
evaporation losses and is therefore more water efficient.26 Another water saving method is 
genetic modification. Genetic improvements of plants might create crops which are more 
resistant to water stress, caused by drought or salinity. By creating plants that require less 
water for the same crop yield, water consumption can be reduced. Technological 
improvements and more investments in water development can also increase the amount of 
fresh water at the disposal of humans. Waste-water reclamation, desalination and fossil-aquifer 
development are improvements which will enlarge the total water supply available in the 
world.27 
By using political policy domestic use can be cut back. Realistic prizing of water, by cutting 
subsidies on water, ensures that people are more often confronted with the value of water; in 
this way they are less likely to waste it. Another policy choice is using educational programs to 
raise public awareness for water-saving methods. The promotion of more frugal use of water 
and providing the public with information about the amount of water that products require 
raises public awareness of water saving methods.28 For example, the Dutch energy label gives 
information about the amount of water a machine consumes when in operation.29 Policy which 
reduces population growth will also reduce demand for water.30 Furthermore, international 
policy can also increase the yields of water. The development of interbasin-water management, 
shared information and technology and joint-regional planning will ensure that water is used in 
the most efficient way. The problem is that all these technological and policy changes require 
vast sums of money. As long as politicians, corporations and the population do not feel the 
                                                 
25
 ESCWA, ‘Water scarcity’, 17. 
26
 Christine Drake, ‘Water resource conflict in the Middle East’, Journal of Geography 96:1 (1997) 4-12, 9-11. 
27
 Wolf, Hydropolitics, 131. 
28
 Ibidem, 130. 
29
 www.energielabel.nl (June 2011). 
30
 ESCWA, ‘Water scarcity’, 28-30. 
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pressure to act, needed changes will not be made.31 But policy and technological choices can 
influence how much water is used and by using these methods large amounts of water can be 
saved.32 So even though water is going to be more in demand and the amount of fresh water 
available for humans will diminish, this does not necessarily mean that water will eventually be 
a scarce resource. Humans still have a large amount of water saving and water supply enlarging 
options left.  
One option often touched upon in the literature about water conflicts between nations is that 
water can be more handled as a resource. By dealing with water as a resource it can be traded 
in an international water market.33 But compared to other resources, water is (for various 
reasons) a lot more difficult to describe as an economic resource. Water trade options 
therefore are not always viable. The next paragraph will deal with if water can be treated as an 
economic resource. 
  
1.3 Water Economics 
In most countries, the state is the owner of the water. Because water is a public good, you can 
own land on both sides of a river, but you do not own the river that runs between those pieces 
of land. This makes the government of a country responsible for the water management of that 
country. This might also be the case with oil or other mineral resources in a wide variety of 
countries, but water is not only state-owned, it is also vital for the lives of all inhabitants of the 
state. Governments that deal with water resource management are confronted with different 
problems when handling water resource distribution. First, water is a re-usable good, but only if 
you are able to contain it and keep the quality above a certain point. Since water is easily 
polluted, and once polluted it has no substitute.34 The amount of fresh water is limited, so the 
use of the resource by one person detracts from the use of others in society, or in other 
                                                 
31
 Malin Falkenmark, ‘Global water issues confronting humanity’, Journal of Peace Research 27:2 (1990) 177-190,, 
189. 
32
 Wolf, Hydropolitics, 131. 
33
 Allen, The Middle East water question, 114-116. 
34
 Wolf, Hydropolitics, 89.  
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states.35 In case of rivers the upstream riparian always has a geographical advantage compared 
to the downstream riparian. If you use or pollute the water upstream, the water cannot be 
used by the downstream riparian.36 Second, water distribution is highly dependent on climate 
and weather. The amount of water available can differ highly depending on season, weather 
conditions and geographical position (even within countries). Furthermore, water is a motile 
resource; it flows downstream in rivers and groundwater tables rise and drop. Large amounts 
are contained in different parts of the hydrological cycle which makes it hard to quantify. Also 
you never know how much water you will get; the weather is difficult to predict. Flowing and 
unpredictable, it is difficult to quantify because you never know exactly how much water you 
actually have or will receive. These characteristics make water management tricky; the actions 
of one actor might hamper the use of water by others, future availability is unpredictable, it 
does renew itself but you never know at what rate and it is vital for the domestic, industrial and 
agricultural users within the nation.37 
But can water be considered an economic resource?  
If you buy half a liter of chilled bottled water and you pay 2 euro for that bottle, then everybody 
agrees that water is a commodity. You can buy this commodity or sell it on the economic 
market. But when it starts to rain on a farm, most people agree that the farmer should not pay 
for the rain that is coming out of the sky to irrigate his land, and most definitely not pay 2 euro 
per half a liter. This is exactly the problem with water as an economic resource; not all types of 
water are considered equal and can be commoditized equally. The willingness of people to pay 
for this resource differs highly from one type of water to the other. This is one of the reasons 
why water as an economic resource is problematic; the different perceptions and varying 
functions of water make it hard to value.38  
                                                 
35
 Mirjam R. Lowi, ‘Rivers of conflict, rivers of peace’, Journal of International Affairs 49:1 (Summer 1995) 123-
144,126. 
36
 Lowi, ‘Rivers of conflict’, 127. 
37
 Allen, The Middle East water question, 114-115.  
38
 Allen, The Middle East water question, 114-115. 
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In addition to the difficulty of valuation, water has also been placed outside the “rational” 
economic theories.39 Water is not considered a pure economic good by politicians and people, 
and it often has a big emotional and political value. Governments have been reluctant to 
privatize the water market, even if other sectors with a large public responsibility like energy, 
infrastructure and healthcare were privatized.40 The fact that the market might establish a 
water price that makes water unavailable to a part of the population, or deliver water of such 
poor quality that it is unsuitable for human consumption, is such a terrifying thought that 
governments have refrained from privatization of water.41 The reluctance of governments to do 
so illustrates the additional values besides economic ones which people contribute to water. 
Water can have all kinds of values besides economic. It can provide physical security; rivers 
often form the border between nations. It can furnish political and emotional values like 
national pride and historic rights. Water self-sufficiency can provide a nation with the 
psychological value of control, and a shared water resource might furnish bonds between 
nations or create tensions because of perceived (past) injustice. And it can be considered as a 
beautiful and intrinsic part of the environment. 42  These non-economic values make it 
complicated to treat water as solely an economic resource. Take for example the water 
distribution Israel organizes on the Golan Heights. The water the Golan settlers require needs 
to be pumped up from Lake Kinneret, which is located 600 meters below the Golan heights. 
This water is used by the settlers mostly for agricultural purposes. If they were to pay for the 
actual cost of pumping all this irrigation water to their fields, their crops could never be sold on 
the world market for a competitive price. But Israel subsidizes the water the settlers use. The 
country considers the residence of settlers on the Golan Heights essential to the security of the 
country. They are a buffer against Syrian military action and create a base for the territorial 
claim to the Golan, thereby protecting access to Lake Tiberias, which is a strategic component 
                                                 
39
 R. Coopey and T. Tvedt, ‘Water as a unique commodity’ in: R. Coopey and T. Tvedt (eds.), A history of water, 
volume 2: The political Economy of Water (London 2006) viii-xxviii, ix-x and xxvi.  
40
 Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, ‘Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences 
from Afrika, Asia and Latin America’ Environment and Urbanization 15:2 (October 2003) 87-114.  
Germa Bel and Mildred Warner, ‘Does privatization of solid waste and water services reduce costs? A review of 
empirical studies’, Resources, Conservation and Recycling 52 (2008) 1337-1348.        
41
 Coopey and Tvedt, ‘Water as a unique commodity’, xx-xxi.   
42
 Wolf, Hydropolitics, 114. 
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of the Israeli water provision. The water the settlers use therefore needs to be subsidized. 
Without the cheap water, there would be no settlers en without these settlers Israel would lack 
the safety buffer it now has.43 Economically it is not a sound decision to pump water upwards 
for 600 meters to use for irrigation but (geo)politically the monetary cost are justified by the 
(geo)political benefits to the country.  
Such non-economic values attributed to water can hamper efficient water management. Even if 
a water distribution project has a favorable economic outcome for all the participants, politics 
might stop the project from happening.44 This problem can be illustrated by “virtual water”, the 
amount of water which the import products of a nation use. For example, Saudi-Arabia is a  
country bereft of rainfall, thus to sustain agriculture the country uses a lot of ground water 
from aquifers45 for the irrigation of cereals. Given that it takes about 1.000 m³ of water to 
produce one metric ton of grain the country could be more thrifty with its water supply by 
switching to less water-intensive crops. In this way they could export the harvest of this water 
“scarce” crop and import a water demanding product like grain. This would lead to the import 
of virtual water, the water needed to grow the grain in the exporting-country, resulting in 
increased water efficiency for Saudi-Arabia. But the Saudi-Arabian government believes that it 
is in the strategic interest of the country to grow its own grain, so the country can reach a 
certain amount of self-sufficiency in food production. So even though importing virtual water 
(by switching to other agricultural crops) is the economically and environmentally most logical 
water saving policy, the measure is not taken because it is not the most politically feasible 
policy.46 For water management to be effective and politically feasible it has to balance politics, 
economics, environmental aspects and national security.47 Water is a resource with dimensions 
beyond the scope of economics. Treating water solely as an economic commodity is therefore 
impossible. 
 
                                                 
43
 Wolf, Hydropolitics, 113.  
44
 Heather L. Beach, et al, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution (New York 2000) 27-35. 
45
 A body of permeable rock, for example, unconsolidated gravel or sand stratum, that is capable of storing 
significant quantities of water, is underlain by impermeable material, and through which groundwater moves. 
46
 ESCWA, ‘Water scarcity’, 11. 
47
 Allen, The Middle East water question, 184. 
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1.4 Concluding remarks about water 
“When you drink the water, remember the spring” (Chinese Proverb)48 
 
Water has no substitute and is vital to the livelihoods of inhabitants and essential for the 
economic performance of states. Dependency upon water is not necessarily linked to the level 
of economic development of a country, with rich countries like the United States and Israel 
being water scarce and poorer countries like Myanmar and Vietnam being water rich. In regions 
where water is in short supply water stress can occur, i.e. when water is so scarce that political 
pressure is placed on actors within the states to make sure there is enough water to maintain 
the state’s infrastructure.49  
Hydrologist Malin Falkenmark, notes in Global Water Issues Confronting Humanity that in case 
of global water issues: “No one is responsible, no one has the comprehensive overview, nor does 
anyone have the competence to act.” The global water shortage is depicted here as a modern 
tragedy of the commons, where nobody feels responsible for a shared and vital part of the local 
economy, until it is too late. She notes that the global water crisis is in fact: “a crisis in man’s 
behavior in the living environment, the disrespect for the available water and water cycle, and 
the unwillingness to adapt to these hydrological laws, by climatic-biased and water-illiterate 
decision-makers”.50 
So water is quite essential for the functioning of the state but water is not valued accordingly. 
Instead it is wasted and distribution decisions are made on non-hydrological grounds.  
For my thesis these conclusions imply that water scarcity could be more of a political issue in 
the future and that therefore if water scarcity leads to conflicts, these conflicts will become 
more frequent in the future. However, these conflicts might be prevented by investments in 
water saving methods. The changes necessary for water savings are costly and require an active 
mindset of the general public as well as politicians. As discussed in this chapter water is not an 
                                                 
48
 The Quotations page, Quotation #2604 from Laura Moncur's Motivational Quotations, 
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/2604.html (september 2011).  
49
 Kevin Freeman, ‘Water wars? Inequalities in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin’, Geopolitics 6:2 (autumn 2001) 127-
140, 127-128. 
50
 Malin Falkenmark, ‘Global water issues confronting humanity’, Journal of Peace Research 27:2 (1990) 177-190, 
189. 
16 | P a g e  
 
economic commodity in a strict sense, and therefore cannot be treated as only an economic 
resource. In the next chapter I will discuss Water War theory and Resource Curse theory. As 
Resource Curse theory is a theory which is based on resources solely, can this theory be applied 
to a resource which is not completely economic?   
17 | P a g e  
 
2. Water and conflict 
 
“As Malthusian pressures depress per capita incomes, it comes to a choice between fighting and 
starving”.51  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will describe the Water Wars theory and the Resource Curse theory and how 
both theories are relevant for my conflict cases. First I will deal with Water War theory; 
describing what the theory states and how the theory came to be part of the academic 
discourse. Then I will elaborate on the Resource Curse theory and the part of Resource Curse 
which deals with how resources can lead to conflicts. Finally, I will explain how both theories 
form the setting of my hypothesis and explain the grounds on which I base my research.  
 
2.2 Water Wars in an international context 
- The next wars in the Middle East will be fought over water. (World Bank Vice-President 
Ismail Serageldin, 1995)52  
- The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water. (Egyptian president Anwar 
Sadat in the spring of 1979)53 
 
What will be the international consequences of the water stress if politicians refrain from 
hydrologically sound policy? In 1991 Joyce R. Starr published the article Water Wars in Foreign 
Policy.54 In the article Starr argued that the growing water scarcity in the world would 
eventually lead to armed conflict with nations fighting a vital, increasingly scarce resource. The 
Middle East was especially in danger because the region is one of the most arid regions of the 
world and is overusing its water supply and exhausting its ground water reserves. The Middle 
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East was and is fraught with international conflict and has a high rate of interstate violence. The 
First Gulf War (1990-1991) was considered a resource war by some politicians and scholars. 
Saddam Hussein tried to grab the Kuwait oil reserve and America stepped in to defend its 
strategic regional partner and economic interests.55 The fact that a resource war had already 
occurred combined with the military and political tension in the region would make another 
conflict a realistic possibility. The fact that the region has a lot of shared transboundary fresh 
water sources, could easily turn water stress into water war. Because of this, the author 
considered the entry level for water conflict low.56 According to Starr, the solution would be for 
the United States to step up and realize that water is of enormous strategic importance in the 
region. Water should be taken into account when international negotiations take place. 
Preferably, this should lead to treaties in which all nations who share the same scarce water 
resource participate and agree on how to use and share water resources, whilst taking into 
account the interests of other nations.57   
According to Peter Gleick, a scientist working on environment, economic development and 
international security, water can lead to resource conflict when the specific water resource has 
a great economic and political value to a nation. This value is determined by different factors: 
the degree of scarcity, the extent to which the water supply is shared and the alternative water 
resources which are available.58 This compared to the degree to which water is vital for the 
economy makes water of strategic importance, and as such part of “Realpolitik”. If politicians 
and policy makers consider water to be an important and valuable commodity, they might be 
prepared to defend it with force should the need arise.59  
But Gleick and Starr have not been the only ones who published about Water Wars theory. A 
vast amount of literature is available. Not only the Middle East is considered a region in danger 
of water conflict, other regions are also considered at risk. The nations sharing the same water 
of the Danube, Ganges or Zambezi, or the problems facing the countries sharing Lake Chad, the 
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Aral Sea or Lake Victoria, are all named as potential water conflicts.60 Basically, the reason for 
all potential water conflicts can be summarized as follows: We have a limited amount of water, 
how do we share it? And if we cannot reach an agreement with friendly means, violence might 
turn out to be the option which solves the problem, at least temporarily.61 
Often Water Wars literature has the tendency to be alarmist, raise awareness and spot 
potential conflicts. Politicians, United Nations publications and NGO’s are very fond of using 
water conflict rhetoric; as the quotes at the beginning of the chapter exemplify. Water Wars 
theory is widely used in journalistic publications and quoted by policy makers because Water 
Wars has credibility with the public. But Water Wars is not a theory which is widely accepted in 
the academic world. A vast amount of literature has been written which doubts the assumption 
that water scarcity will inevitably lead to conflict. Since the water war in Mesopotamia no war, 
where water was the main driver of conflict between nations, has occurred. 62 Scholars 
publishing about Water Wars have provided a wide variety of description of water related 
tensions and a few conflicts in which water was a contributing factor.63 But researchers at 
Oregon State University found that if water was a contributing factor in violence between 
states, in 30 of the 37 cases of water related violence, the conflict was between Israel and its 
neighbors. 64 Since this relation cannot be described as stable, even without water as a factor 
on can question why water war still causes so much stir in the academic circles? And what is the 
reason that even though water is becoming scarce, water scarcity does not translate to 
hostilities, violence and interstate wars?  
There are a number of possible explanations for this. First of all, wars are expensive and 
resource wars rarely achieve their goals. The First Gulf War is a very good example of why 
resource conflict is unlikely to erupt in the near future. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 
cost approximately $100 billion, and he was not able to secure the Kuwait oil production of 1.5 
million barrels a day. In fact, this risky move eventually cost him his regime and his head. In 
comparison, on the stock market Exxon paid $80 billion to secure Mobil’s 1.7 million oil-barrels 
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a day, a merger which was very successful. Trade offers a much cheaper and more reliable way 
of attaining resources than war.65 In chapter 1 I have argued that water is not a normal 
resource which can be traded as easily as oil. But still economic viable options besides war are 
available to nations. War is very expensive and as long as states have cheaper options for 
attaining water they will not go to war over water. Water is simply not valuable enough. To cite 
an Israeli mayor-general responsible for military strategy during the 1967 and 1982 wars: “For 
the price of one week of fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss of life, no 
international pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend in hostile territory”.66  
This critique of the Water Wars theory is based on the Cornucopian model which beliefs that 
the free market will eventually relieve scarcity.67 As water becomes more scarce, prices will 
increase, which will lower demand and prolong depletion of the resource. In the meantime 
technological innovations can help relieve water scarcity pressures.68 Part of this theory is 
supported by the water saving options still available in the world. At this moment, water saving 
options are not always the politically and financially viable solution for a country. However as 
water scarcity will put more pressure on the water resources of nations, these investments 
might prove more feasible in the future. Rising oil prices made deep sea drillings for oil an 
economically viable investment. In the past the technically complicated off shore oil platforms 
where too expensive to operate, but rising oil prices made these oil platforms, despite of high 
cost, profitable. The same mechanism might occur with water saving options.      
The second critique of Water Wars is based on political realism. Nations only go to war if there 
is a likeliness that they will win and if the proceeds of victory are high. Otherwise the risks of 
going to war are greater than the eventual benefits. Kevin Freeman, a professor in the study of 
government and public services, offers a simple matrix based on the research (1984) by Naff 
and Matson about water and cooperation/conflict in the Middle East.69 The matrix (see table 1) 
shows the likeliness of nations going into conflict over water of the Euphrates River. The matrix 
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shows three criteria for water related conflict, 1) state interest and issues in the watershed, 2) 
riparian position, and 3) external and internal power. He applies a weight to the criteria with 1 
being weak and 5 being strong. Conflict potential is high when the sum of the criteria is roughly 
equal.70 
Table 1: The Kevin Freeman model for conflict in the Euphrates River Basin71 
State Interest Position Power Total 
Turkey 4 5 5 14 
Syria 4 3 2 9 
Iraq 4 1 2 7 
 
Because Turkey is militarily so much stronger than the other states and Syria is stronger than 
Iraq the chance of conflict over water erupting in the Euphrates River basin is unlikely. The fact 
that in most shared water resources one of the shareholders is a much stronger political and 
military power reduces the probability of military conflict over water. Power politics deters the 
likeliness of conflict over shared water resources.72 
Finally, a large amount of the discourse over water management between nations is focused on 
how shared water resources more often stimulated negotiations and cooperation instead of 
leading to conflict. Despite tremendous tension, nations who have been at war with one 
another have stayed at the negotiation table when water was concerned. So Indians and 
Pakistani, Arabs and Israeli and Azeris and Armenians have negotiated water treaties while 
being political and military enemies.73 According to Wolf et al, the acts of cooperation 
outnumber the acts of violence over shared water resources. Politicians seem to use fiery 
rhetoric when water is concerned, but rarely use violence. The harsh words are more often 
aimed at their own constituencies than towards the enemy.74 Different scientific studies 
advocate unitary basin-wide agreements under the guidance of international institutions as the 
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best way of preventing interstate violence.75 But the cost of war in combination with the 
difference in strength between nations often already seems to prevent the outbreak of armed 
conflict, so cooperation and international negotiations are not even necessary to prevent 
conflict over water. Water is just not valuable and not hard enough to attain to be a reason for 
war between states. States still have many alternatives of obtaining water before reverting to 
warfare and this prevents water tension from becoming water war.         
That said about water war between states, water scarcity within states is also often named as a 
reason for armed conflict or violent protests. Although often not the root cause of conflict, 
water seems to lead to conflict within states as protest erupts over the over tapping of water 
resources. Water has been named a contributing reason for the internal conflicts in Rwanda, 
China, Sudan and Karachi.76 But the systems and methods of scholars studying Water Wars is 
often inexplicit. The overall argument seems to be that Water Wars will occur because water is 
becoming a scarcer commodity. How scholars reach this conclusion and based on which cases is 
often unclear. There does not seem to be a lot of proof for the Water Wars theory except that it 
does sound logical that scarcity will lead to conflict. But the overall evidence for Water Wars is 
very thin. Because Resource Curse does offer tools to study internal resource conflicts, the next 
paragraph deals with this topic. With the tools Resource Curse theory provides, hopefully we 
will be able to look into local water conflicts and see if water is a contributing factor or even the 
driver of conflicts.  
 
2.3 Resource Curse 
Armed conflict in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political 
ecology closely linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources.77  
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Various economic studies indicate a correlation between being rich in mineral resources and 
having low economic growth rates. 78 The first renowned publication on the so-called Resource 
Curse was authored by economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner in 1995.79 Sachs and 
Warner showed that economies with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 1971 
(the base year) tended to have low growth rates during the subsequent period 1971-89.80 
According to Sachs and Warner, these negative growth rates came forth from Dutch Disease 
effect; high percentages of mineral resources in exports harm the rate of exchange of the local 
currency, and this high exchange rate harms the local industrial sector.81 
After this path-breaking publication, more research into the effects of resources on the 
economy has been done. Historians, economists, econometricians and social scientist have all 
since then published extensively on the effects of resources on economic growth rates.82 Even if 
studies take different factors into account, still the effect of natural resources on economic 
growth is proven to be negative. But there is no scholarly consensus about causes. Why do 
countries that are rich in mineral resources have a smaller economic growth rate than countries 
that do not have these mineral resources at their disposal?83 Various factors are blamed for the 
bad economic performance of mineral rich countries. Bad institutions, rent seeking by elites, 
Dutch Disease, economic instability (originated in the dependence on an export commodity), 
unproductive investments done by the governments to satisfy the population whilst keeping 
state power in the hands of a lucky few, lootability of the natural resources and decreased 
productivity of the population are just a few of the explanations used.84 For my thesis, the part 
of the Resource Curse theory that is about how resources will lead to conflict is most relevant. 
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As conflict has a negative outcome on economic performance, it can be a cause for the 
Resource Curse. Before investigating the effect in the cases of water resources on conflict, it is 
relevant to look at how resources are connected to conflict.  
  
2.4 Resources and Conflict 
“Economically, if it is scarcity that creates value, it is abundance that creates wealth”85 
 
According to political scientist Travis Sharp, resource scarcity stems from the social and political 
condition of inequality and injustice that humankind has created and perpetuated in its struggle 
for power and dominance globally and within states.86 In other words, natural resources are 
unevenly distributed across the globe. To gain or maintain access to resource for a specific 
group, humans create and maintain systems to gain access to resources. These systems humans 
have created result in economic inequality. This inequality in resource access leads to resource 
scarcity among nations or within countries between different societal groups. But does this 
resource inequality cause tension and conflict? The availability in nature of any resource is not 
in itself an indicator of conflict. Rather the value people attribute to the need of a resource 
makes the possession of a resource an indicator for resource conflict.87 Resource conflicts 
happen because people and nations start fighting each other to secure access to resources. The 
more scarce and valuable the resource, the more bitter the fighting to gain, regain or maintain 
access to that resource.88 According to the political-economists John Maxwell and Rafael 
Reuveny resource scarcity needs to be combined with economic decline, population migration, 
weak political institution, the erosion of confidence in the government or an already political 
unstable situation to be able to lead to resource conflict.89 For example the natural resource 
scarcity in El Salvador caused migration to Honduras which created tension whis eventually led 
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to the 1969 Soccer War.90 The more apparent cause of the conflict was the cultural and 
economic strains which were caused by the migration of a large portion of the El Salvadorian 
population. But without the resource scarcity in El Salvador these people would not have 
migrated in the first place. Resource scarcity was the root cause and combined with one of the 
trigger factors this led to resource conflict. 
Resource scarcity can lead to conflicts but resource abundance can also lead to conflicts. Within 
society the access of one social group to abundant resources can cause friction. The unequal 
distribution of resources between social groups leads to a gap in society between people who 
do have access to resource income and people who do not, this can cause friction.  
Wars over resources happen frequently because primary commodities are easily and heavily 
taxable, and are therefore attractive to both the ruling elites and their competitors. The 
availability of resources represents the prize of winning the state or territorial control. The 
higher the prize gained by winning the state, the greater the risk of greed-driven conflicts. For 
example, an elite having control over the oil industry of a country not only enables the elite to 
extract an income from that oil sector, but also creates tension between the elite and other 
groups in society who also want to have access to that resource income. If rebels gain control 
over part of the oil industry, that does not only provide them with an income, it also offers 
them the money to purchase military equipment. New military equipment enables the rebels to 
fight the elite further, thus enabling the escalation of the conflict.91 Economists Collier and 
Hoeffler show that resource abundance escalates conflicts. According to them, the financing for 
a conflict is easier when the loaner believes he or she will receive a profit when the fighting 
ends. As the prize for the winner is greater than in resource poor nations, gaining financing for 
and persisting in your rebellion is easier. Because of these mechanisms resource abundance can 
cause conflict. The resource rents or loot that can be extracted from resources is therefore an 
important cause for conflict.92 But resource income does not only provide a reason to start 
fighting in undemocratic nations, it also provides a reason to start fighting in democratic ones.93 
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Economists Silje Aslaksen and Ragnar Torvik show that a high prize value of the state actually 
leads to conflict. This effect occurs because when you get to power by using force, you are not 
accountable to voters, which makes it easier to extract the resource rents. The great prize of 
winning conflicts in resource rich nations makes it more likely that people who want to get to 
power use force instead of democratic processes.94 
Resource abundance or resource scarcity within a nation heightens the likeliness of resource 
conflict. Research into the subject of resources and civil war resulted in the following causes for 
resource conflict: greed and grievance.95 Natural resources can have two different ways of 
generating greed and grievance. First, there are results that have an effect on rebels and other 
people in the state. Second, there are effects that are influencing the state itself. How the state 
or its inhabitants are influenced by natural resources results in different sorts of grievances or 
greed.96 
Greed can be a reason for resource conflict for three different reasons. First, domestic groups 
may use quasi-criminal activities to benefit from resource income independent from the state. 
Sierra Leone is a good example. Here rebel groups created illegal diamond extraction areas, 
which they shielded from the state and protected with force.97 This method of resource greed is 
also known as spoil politics, where the economy shows a shift from normal economic activity to 
illicit but profitable economic activities (drug trafficking, money laundering) and downright 
plunder of available resources.98 Second, having control of the government provides more 
income than in resource poor nations. This leads to the second form of resource greed, 
capturing the state. In Chad, oil reserves led to violent coups, sanctioned by military men trying 
to grab control over the state. It should be noted that the first method shields the state off 
from certain areas of its territory, and therefore leads to the weakening of the state. The 
second method however is focused on capturing the state so a maximum of income can be 
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extracted from the resources. The coup plotters or rebels want to use the state because it has 
the best extraction mechanism available to a greedy group wanting to provide a maximum of 
resource income to its members.99 So the coup that killed president Tombalbaye of Chad in 
1975 was organized in such a way that the new president and his supporters could reap the 
benefits of the Chadian oil fields in the south.100  
Third, natural resources might lead a region to believe it will be better off without the country it 
originally belongs to. This can lead to secessionist rebel groups which try to split the state into 
multiple new states. Most often this is the case with a resources rich region which is trying to 
achieve secession from a resource poor region. Like Aceh, an oil rich region in Indonesia which 
for years had a very active rebel militia trying to achieve independence.101 Resources provide 
rebels with a cause and a prospect for the future. They fight because they believe that if they 
win there will be more resource income for them and their supporters. 
When resource greed leads to conflict it can be very difficult for a nation to return to normal 
economic circumstances. The whole economy can be corrupted by criminal acts and illicit 
economic activities by rebels, governments and elites. Bad governance becomes a symptom of 
states faced with greedy rebels and governments. In its most extreme form peace treaties 
cannot be enforced by leaders, because followers and subordinates are more influenced by 
their personal economic gains.102 People choose to fight if it pays better than their alternative 
sources of income.103 This is the reason why greed and conflict can be connected to resource 
scarcity. Resource scarcity increases the financial and political demands on a government 
dealing with the distribution of the scarce resource.104 If a resource becomes scarcer this leads 
to tensions, especially if there is an elite group which is dependent on the extraction of the 
income generated by this resource. A widening gap between the state capacity to provide its 
subjects with the income they demand and the income the state can make available, leads to 
tension. This tension can become conflict if the state has few other grounds for legitimacy 
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except the distribution of income derived from resources.105 The Arab Spring is a good example 
of how resource scarcity can lead to conflict. Rising food prices and growing populations can 
cause undemocratic governments to fall. Governments ruled by autocrats like Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali and Muammar Ghadaffi, are foremost founded on the oil wealth they distribute to the 
population and especially their own ruling elite and social class. The harsh economic climate 
made the regimes unattractive to other parts of the population.106 Faced with a government 
based only on distribution of oil wealth to its own societal group other societal groups started 
to revolt because they were lacking in income caused by rising food prices. An unfair 
distribution of resource income combined with harsh economic conditions led to conflict.  
Resource conflict only happens if scarcity leads to economic stress which is severe, persistent 
and pervasive enough to erode the legitimacy or moral authority of the government and/or 
dominant social order.107 The legitimacy of the state is interconnected with the chances of civil 
unrest. The power balance and legitimacy of a government might be disrupted by growing 
scarcity. Domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt 
favorable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. 
Scarcity might force the politicians to favor one group over another group and thereby creating 
civil unrest.108 Especially the marginalization in society of a powerless group by elites can lead 
to conflict.109 The powerless group has no other option than violence because otherwise the 
elite will redistribute the resources to the disadvantage of the powerless group. The level at 
which the powerless group in society reverts to violence depends on how much the elite is 
undermining its own power and authority. The extent to which the greed of the elite is harming 
the other groups in society translates to how deep the grievances of the powerless group 
become.110 In the eyes of the marginalized, the greed leads to a perceived economic injustice. A 
widening gap between the level (of income, scarce resources or other commodity) the 
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marginalized believe they deserve and the level they actually receive reaches a point in which 
dissatisfaction leads to conflict.111  
The point above also proves the difficulty in discerning between the different reasons for 
resource conflict. The above noted situation is listed as elite greed. Where an elite is trying to 
capture a scarce resource. But this resource conflict might also be considered part of the 
grievance mechanism of resource conflict, because marginalized groups in society feel that 
conflict is the only option left to them to prevent loss of a vital resource. Next to greed, 
grievance is the other mechanism at work when considering resource conflict. The grievance 
mechanism is based on political and economic inequality; but this mechanism can work in 
different ways.112  
First, resources might create transitory inequality. A change in the amount of resources in a 
society leads to a new distribution of resource income. The effect of this new resource 
distribution on society might be considered unfair, especially if a group in society is facing the 
negative effects of the resource and is not profiting from the positive effects.113 For example, 
after oil was found in Saudi-Arabia, the manufacturing sector of the country faced severe terms 
of trade shocks and their competitiveness on the world market was harmed by the strong local 
currency. But the manufacturers were not the group in society which was reaping the benefits 
of the oil dollars. The oil dollars were spent on luxury import products by the elite controlling 
the state. This resulted in impoverishment and grievances of the handicrafters. They did not 
consider oil a positive change for the country, because they only faced the negative 
consequences without profiting from the benefits.114 This dichotomy in the distribution of profit 
and loss can lead to tensions in society, especially if the dichotomy is considered unjust.  
Second, the process of resource extraction might cause grievances because of forced migration, 
environmental damage and loss of land rights. The devastating impact of the Papua New 
Guinea copper mine on the environment is considered one of the root causes for the rebel 
activity in the region. 115 If you pollute the land that is the source of income for the population 
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and democratic processes do not offer an outlet for resentment, then you leave people no 
other means to express their grievance than through conflict.116 
Third, the terms of trade shocks apparent in states which are highly dependent on natural 
resources, creates economic vulnerability and great economic fluctuations. These economic 
shocks can create civil unrest as people see their livelihood threatened.117 The dramatic 
collapse on the world market of the price of coffee, and the devastating economic 
consequences for countries totally dependent on this commodity resulted in tensions within 
states.118        
And finally, natural resource wealth distribution differences are considered less just than other 
economical differences in society. Income differences caused by the job or intelligence level 
somebody possesses are considered fair. Gaining income from resources causes wealth 
differences which are not based on personal capacity and are therefore considered less just. 
The conflict over uranium in Niger is a good example of this; the insurgent groups from the 
north not only claim that the political center in the south is not investing enough in the north 
but also that the south is economically relying heavily on the uranium wealth of the north.119  
Next to the resources greed and grievances mechanism a few other observations about 
resources and conflict have been made in the academic literature. One of these is that 
resources which lead to conflict do not have to be mineral resources. Even though agricultural 
commodities only generate modest rents, they still generate a significant risk for conflict.120 
This effect of resources and conflict is surprising as a large part of the literature focuses on how 
conflict results from the probability of loot extracted from resource income. Looting in this 
context means that the resource income is not used for public investments but used for 
personal gains.121 As the income from water is mostly generated by agricultural produce this 
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fact is very relevant for the question if water can lead to conflict. This link is also applicable for 
land scarcity.    
 
The literature on resource scarcity conflict faces the same problem as Water Wars; resource 
conflicts only happen if there are multiple other factors besides resource scarcity/abundance 
contributing to the conflict. Energy policy expert David Victor argues in his article “What 
resource wars” that resource at best have mixed and indirect effect on conflict. According to 
the author the real problem is that resources can undermine the democratic transitions taking 
place within countries and conflict arises when societies fail to organize their economies around 
investments and productivity. 122  This is in accordance with the findings of economists 
Brunschweiler and Bulte that resources can only be a reason for small scale conflict and not for 
full blown war.123 It all comes down to the discussion: what is the root cause of a conflict? As 
political scientist Homer-Dixon points out; resource scarcity in a society might emphasize the 
impact of already existing vulnerabilities, including its ethnic cleavages and skewed distribution 
of land, wealth and power.124 Victor believes that resource wars are not a realistic threat to 
humanity, or the real cause of conflict.125 So can the real cause of conflict originated in greed or 
grievance caused by water scarcity? Or do other factors contribute more and is water only a 
contributing factor of conflict? Defense and governance specialists Goodman and Kern argue 
that the fact that resource wars have not happened often in the past does not mean they 
cannot happen in the future.126 Can water really be a cause for conflict? The next paragraph 
explains how I want to link Water Wars with resource conflict.  
 
2.5 Water resources and internal conflict 
In the first chapter I noted how fresh water is becoming scarcer, has a limited supply in the 
world and is an unusual economic commodity because it has such a large emotional and 
political value. In my second chapter I explained how Water War theory states that water 
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scarcity can lead to water conflict. But I also highlight the fact that the theoretical foundation of 
Water War theory is questionable. It seems if politicians use Water War as a way to shake up 
debates but do not actually stand their ground when the discussion on water becomes heated. 
And scholars do not find convincing evidence for the theory.  
In the previous paragraph I looked into how resources are related to conflict. Here the systems 
behind resource driven conflicts and the methods and explanations used in the academic 
discourse are elaborated on. Furthermore I showed the different greed and grievance driven 
reasons for resource conflict. These systems will be used to test the hypothesis that water 
scarcity is an important driver in the conflict cases. 
After providing the reader with the necessary background on the context of water and the 
theoretical framework of my thesis I formulate my hypothesis about water scarcity and water 
conflict within states. My thesis combines two main elements from Water Wars and Resource 
Curse. First, from Water Wars the claim that water scarcity will eventually lead to conflict. 
Second, from Resource Curse Thesis, the notion that grievances, caused by greedy resource 
income seeking elites will lead to conflict. Combining these theories leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
Water can lead to internal conflicts within states when elites try to divert the scarce water to 
the most easily lootable production method.  
 
The background of the hypothesis is the following. Countries are facing water distribution 
decisions as water is becoming more scarce. The state is based on a coalition of different 
groups in society. And to secure itself of the base it needs for survival, the state has to provide 
certain interest groups with the income they demand. If water becomes scarce, the state makes 
distribution decisions based on which elite groups are supportive of the state. As water 
resources become scarce, greed for the water will lead groups to try and attain as much of it as 
possible, herewith providing for their own income. As marginalized groups in society are faced 
with elites diverting the water, transitory tension within society arises. I expect that farmers are 
especially vulnerable to water diversions. For farmers, irrigation water is of vital importance for 
their economic survival. Farmers rarely belong to the ruling elite of a nation and are therefore 
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easily marginalized within society. So farmers are faced with growing water scarcity, which will 
lead to a negative revaluation of their land and income. If water is diverted away from 
agricultural use the output of the fields will decline, and so will the income of farmers. The 
damaged agricultural output leads to transitory tension, this tension leads to grievances as one 
group in society is profiting from the new distribution, while the other faces only negative 
consequences. If these grievances have no other outlet, this leads to conflict. When the state is 
not receptive to the complaints of the marginalized farmers, no other option is left open to 
these farmers than conflict. In this way water scarcity can lead to conflict.  
The erosion of confidence in the government and weak institutions of the government are 
necessary criteria for this hypothesis. Because the government needs to be receptive to the 
pressures from an elite and the marginalized farmers need to have no other option than 
conflict to resolve the grievance they feel towards the government or elite. 
Anthropologist Mary Douglas has made a group/grid theory about how water connects to 
power and control in society.  
 
Tabel 2: The Douglas grid theory 127 
       2.2 Description of the players 
2.1 Inspiration of the players 
 
= Important alignment 
 
First, there are individuals, and political and bureaucratic elites which can exert influence on 
affairs by holding high positions in political hierarchies. These are the hierarchists of power, in 
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positions in government departments, in religious bodies or in other institutions that regulate 
and provide public services. Second, there was the mass of the people who were fatalists, 
because their only role is to respond to the other three actors in society. Third, she identified 
individualists or entrepreneurs, who seek opportunities to use and combine resources to 
provide goods and services. And finally there were the egalitarians or ethicists who are inspired 
by principles of equity and environmental and economic principles.128 
The Douglas grid can clarify my hypothesis in a simple way. The alignment between the 
hierarchists and the individualists/entrepreneurs explains why the fatalists resort to violence to 
express grieve. The actions by the hierarchists can lead to conflict over scarce water resources 
in the following circumstances. The hierarchists are the ones in power, but the base of their 
power lies in support from the individualists/entrepreneurs. To make sure their base of support 
stays happy and to make sure this group keeps supporting the hierarchists, decisions have to be 
made which please the individualists/entrepreneurs. If a change in the base situation leads to 
scarcity, redistribution decision have to take into account how the hierarchists try to keep their 
base of power intact. In practice the scarce fresh water resources will be used by the 
hierarchists in a way which pleases the individualists/entrepreneurs the most. The fatalists are 
the victims of the new redistribution of available fresh water resources. The fatalists are 
without power and the hierarchists feel that support from the fatalist is not necessary to keep 
them in power. To try and influence the decisions of the hierarchists and to achieve control, the 
fatalist resorts to violence. For this group, violence is the only way to receive attention from the 
people in control. They hope that this negative attention leads to a reconsideration of the 
water distribution decision.  
Water historians Coopey and Tvedt offer a good example of how this system of 
disempowerment might work. In South Africa during apartheid, water distribution reinforced 
the existing racially based political power structure. White farmer settlers had a big water 
advantage over rural black Africans. The water distribution was based on the fact that the 
power of the government was based on the white farmers supporting apartheid. Blacks had no 
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legal way to influence the policy of the South African government.129  According to my 
hypothesis a change in distribution might have caused the rural black farmers to see no other 
option to express their grievances than conflict. 
 
In chapter three and four I will explain if my hypothesis is correct for the Darfur and Chinese 
conflicts. Next to testing my hypothesis I will also explain if water scarcity caused these conflicts. 
At the end of my thesis I will conclude if water scarcity can lead to internal conflicts and if the 
framework of the Resource Curse thesis offers the tools required for studying water conflicts.  
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3. Case study 1: Water and conflict in Darfur 
 
“There is a very strong link between land degradation, desertification and conflict in Darfur. 
Northern Darfur—where exponential population growth and related environmental stress have 
created the conditions for conflicts to be triggered and sustained by political, tribal or ethnic 
differences—can be considered a tragic example of the social breakdown that can result from 
ecological collapse." (UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon)130    
 
Map 1: Sudan 
 
Source: Adapted from: The United Nation Cartographic section, ‘Sudan, map: 4458’ (September 2011).  
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3.1 Introduction 
When asked about the fate of the surrounding Arab villages, he replied, “The people who were 
in the villages around us were the ones who were killing us, so how can they kill themselves?” 
(Eyewitness account of the attackers of his village)131 
 
In 2003 large groups of sedentary Nomadic Darfurians cooperated with the central Sudanese 
government to attack farmer communities in Darfur. Villages were bombed by airplanes of the 
government in Khartoum before the attackers riding on horses, camels or pick-up trucks armed 
with machine guns arrived. The attackers killed, raped, plundered and set fire. In 2004 the 
second wave of attacks began. Various estimates put the death toll of the outburst of violence 
in 2003-2004 and the ensuing drought, famine and destitution, at between 100.000-400.000 
victims.132 2,7 million Darfurians currently reside in harsh conditions in refugee camps in Darfur 
and Chad. Although the outburst of violence in Darfur must be considered multi-causal, this 
chapter examines the role water played in this tragedy. In chapter two I gave five reasons how 
resource scarcity can lead to conflict: economic decline, population migration, weak political 
institution, erosion of confidence in the government or/and an already politically unstable 
region.133 In this chapter I explain how resource scarcity led to conflict in Darfur and if water 
was the scarce resource which caused the conflict. I use the greed and grievances mechanism 
to describe the actions taken by the different actors in Sudanese and Darfurian society. In the 
first paragraph the historic background of the Darfur conflict is covered. In the second 
paragraph I discuss how the Darfur conflict escalated into the mass violence of 2003. Finally, I 
conclude what role water scarcity had in the Darfur conflict. 
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3.2 Background of the Darfur conflict 
Sudan is the former largest country in Africa (until the secession of Southern Sudan in 2011) 
and Darfur is the western region of the country.134 A Dar was the name the English gave to the 
homeland of an ethnic group, the name Darfur therefore means the homeland of the Fur.135 
Darfur is about the size of France and is divided in three parts: North-, West- and South-Darfur. 
As the provinces compromise a large territory there are different climatic conditions depending 
on the region. While the south of Darfur is a rich savanna where a relatively large amount of 
rain falls, the northern part of North-Darfur is a desert. Between north and south the climate 
slowly changes from desert to savanna. Darfur is the only region in Sudan which does not 
border the Nile. Water access in Darfur is essential for economic survival as most people are 
pastoralists or farmers.  
Although the Fur were the largest ethnic group in Darfur (2 million people) they have never 
comprised a majority of the Darfurian people. Darfur is a region with very distinct ethnic groups 
with their own tradition and culture, but the ethnic boundaries were never impermeable. For 
example, a successful Fur farmer could invest his profit in cattle, and if his herd grew it could 
have been more profitable for him to become a cattle-nomad. To become a nomad he would 
have to cross the ethnic frontier. With the right cultural adaptations and marriages his 
descendants would have become part of the Baqqara ethnic tribe within a few generations.136 
Ethnic boundaries in Darfur are not solid and permanent, they are intermittent and flexible. So 
even though the Darfur conflict is highly racialized; the differences between the ethnic groups 
in Darfur are more based on culture and the way of living than grounded in religion or race. 
Even so in newspapers and other journalistic publications the distinction between Arabs and 
Africans is considered one of the root causes for the conflict.137   
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Map 2: Ethnic tribes in Darfur 
 
Source: Micheal S. Miller for Human Rights Watch, ‘Map of Darfur, Sudan: Ethnic Groups’, (2004). 
 
Darfur is very dry, but still people have always been able to survive and extract an economic 
surplus from harsh environmental conditions. But during the last fifty years this started to 
change. First, Darfur has faced an exponential population growth. In 1956 Darfur had a 
population of 1.08 million people, or a person/km² ratio of 3. In 2003, before the violence 
erupted, Darfur had an estimated population of 6.48 million, or a person/Km² ratio of 18. This 
sixfold increase of the population had its consequences on resources; demand for food, 
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livestock and water increased in accord with the rise in population.138 Farmland had to be used 
more intensely to provide enough food for the community. This greater agricultural intensity 
led farmers to abandon practices which enabled them to restore soil quality. The resulting 
deforestation and shortened fallow periods, eventually led to declining crop yields.139 The 
increased agricultural intensity led to soil depletion this combined with droughts affecting the 
area led to desertification, were soil turns to desert and becomes unsuitable for cultivation. The 
desertification led to even greater reductions in the yields of the agriculture.140 Environmental 
scientist Abduljabbar Fadul greatly expounds the effects of this process with an example of crop 
field yields of a Darfurian farmer in Al-Fashir: In 1960 the farm area of Yaqub Ahmed was 60 
mokhamus (5046 square meters) of which he cultivated 12, the yields were 84 sacks of millet 
(100 kg). Which means a yield of 700 kg per mokhamus. In 1984 Yaqub cultivated his entire plot 
of 60 mokhamus and the yield was 12 kg per mokhamus. A dramatic drop in output from 700kg 
to 12kg.141 The declining crop yields resulted in the first reason for resource scarcity conflict, 
economic decline. The combination of land and water scarcity caused by a growing population 
was the origin of this economic decline. 
The progressive desertification of the Darfurian soil proved a great threat for Darfurian 
livelihoods. Not because of the famine that followed the desertification but because of the 
conflicts between farmers and cattle-nomads which resulted from the greater agricultural 
intensity. Over the years conflict between nomads and farmers over grazing areas, watering 
holes and land became more frequent.142 Land rights in Sudan are not organized as they are in 
western parts of the world. Possession of land is not personal and it is indefinite. If a household 
stops using a piece of land, the community leader can reallocate the land to some other 
household who is deemed to need it more. Similarly, newcomers from other villages can be 
given land plots if they show a willingness to contribute to the community. Uncultivated land is 
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free for anyone to use. This system is called usufructuary land rights. The principle of 
usufructuary land rights means that the person who uses the land owns the land temporarily. 
Nomadic tribes in Darfur (Baqqara, Zeeyadiya, Rizeiqat and Bani Halba) are in a very vulnerable 
position, they do not use the land all year round and therefore they do not have a legal claim to 
the lands onto which they migrated and let their animals graze. This insecure legal position of 
the nomadic tribes is in contrast with the position of the farmer tribes (Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa) who use land all year round and settle on the land they cultivate. Pastoralist and 
Cattle-nomads depend for their livelihoods on the seasonal migration of herd and household to 
grazing areas.143 In the usufructuary land system this means that the farmer tribes have legal 
rights to the land but the nomadic tribes land claims are contestable.  
Migration and population growth led to very intense farming in certain, mostly southern, 
Darfurian regions. Plots of land in Darfur, which were formerly uncultivated, were increasingly 
used for agriculture.144 As nomads do not use the lands all year round, they cannot be assured 
that their grazing areas are not cultivated by farmers the next time they arrive. The growing 
agricultural intensity thus means a declining availability of pasture and water sources for 
nomads. Nomadic groups are in great need of areas in which they are assured that next year, 
when they come back they and their livestock are welcome to water, graze and rest.145 For the 
nomads the expansion of agricultural land therefore was a threat to their livelihood.146 
Migratory routes illustrate the dire nomad position; of the eleven traditional migratory routes 
available and agreed upon in the 1950s only three remained in 2007. 147  Due to the 
impoverished environmental conditions, farmers needed more land and started to fence off 
areas which were formerly used for grazing. In the past, migratory routes bordered the fields or 
were fields of which the crops had been harvested; the nomads could feed their animals of the 
stalks and crop residue left after harvest. The farmers would accept this practice because of the 
fertilization of their soil by the cattle and because the transportation and trading options the 
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nomads offered.148 But declining agricultural yields resulted in farmers raising their own cattle 
as a way of diminishing food shortage. The cattle the farmers raised started feeding off the crop 
residue and grazing areas formerly used by nomads. The nomadic lifestyle became threatened 
because of the pasture shortage and nomadic tribes became the most marginalized groups in 
Darfurian society. Because of this economic pressure on their lifestyle the nomadic tribes were 
becoming grieved about their economic position. These grievances were caused by the 
usufructuary land system that did not protect the nomadic land claims. The existing laws were 
not capable of dealing with the outcome of changing environmental conditions. Weak 
institutions are a second reason for resource conflict.  
The increase in population and the growing demand for natural resources happened at a time 
when nature was becoming less forgiving. Darfur was struck by severe droughts in the mid-
sixties, 1973-1975 and 1982-1984. These droughts not only had famine and human suffering as 
a consequence. The droughts caused a severe degrade in soil quality especially in northern 
areas. Former nomadic grazing grounds turned to desert and as a consequence a mass 
migration from the dry northern areas to the milder south occurred.149 In the late eighties the 
southern parts of Darfur were flocked by destitute nomadic tribes searching for land to settle 
on because the drought in the north had driven them off their homelands. Mamdani estimates 
that about 384.000 people migrated from North-Darfur to South-Darfur in 1986 alone.150 In a 
period of extensive drought and growing population this meant a severe strain on the natural 
resources of South-Darfur.151 The water scarcity in the north led to mass migration and growing 
pressure on an environment which was already hard pressed because of population growth. 
The expansion of the farmlands in the south made the mass migration problematic; the lands 
were already taken for agricultural use. There was no land available to sustain the nomadic 
tribes, and tension between “Arab” nomadic tribes and the Fur farmers grew. The Fur decided 
they should defend their land against the Arab invasion. Whilst the Arabs believed they had just 
as much historical rights to the lands of South-Darfur as the Fur farming communities. What 
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emerged were two uncompromising ideologies, the one Arab-Supremacist and the other Fur-
Nativist. Both groups were claiming they had the ultimate right to the land in Darfur and 
claiming the other group had no reason to live on “their” land.152 With tensions rising the two 
groups started to arm themselves. In 1985 the tension and local conflicts exploded in a full 
blown war.153 Thousands perished in this conflict until finally in 1989 the region resembled a 
peaceful state again.154 What made the Arab-Fur war special was that for the first time large 
militias rose in the province. The Fur and the Arab nomadic tribes both fully mobilized their 
people across the whole Darfur region; these ethnic “armies” on both sides contained more 
than 10.000 fighters.155 The term Janjaweed156 was coined in the Arab-Fur war of 1985-1989. 157 
Mass migration is the third reason for resource conflict, and the Arab-Fur war was a direct 
cause of the land scarcity in South-Darfur. The land scarcity in South-Darfur was a direct 
consequence of the lack of rainfall in North-Darfur. Water scarcity led to the mass migration 
that led to the Arab-Fur conflict.  
Climatic conditions, population growth and a changing economic situation had since the sixties 
resulted in increasing tension between the nomadic tribes and the farmer communities. These 
conflicts were difficult to solve because of actions taken by the central government. Darfur has 
always been ruled through a system of native administration and tribal leadership.158 When 
violence erupted among local groups, tribal leaders, whose followers were not part of the 
conflict, acted as mediators. These mediators had great concern for the protection of life and 
property and in the fifties this system worked perfectly well for ending conflicts.159 But after a 
radical government gained power of Sudan in the seventies it dissolved the native government 
ruling system. However, the government in Khartoum did not replace the native administration 
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with effective rule of law by the central government.160 For example, the police lacked fuel, 
weapons, bullets and a local network so they could not offer safety or justice to the population 
of Darfur. The only way for Darfurians to settle conflicts remained through their respective local 
tribal leaders. 161  Therefore justice and violence are not a monopoly controlled by the 
government. The Khartoum government actually has little influence on the local administration 
of justice. The tribal leaders kept their respective roles within their communities, but the 
conflict resolution system between different ethnic groups does not function anymore. This 
means that since the seventies Darfur lacks an accepted, neutral and effective form of conflict 
resolution.162 This means that if conflict occurs between different ethnic groups it becomes very 
difficult to settle in a non-violent way. The tribal leadership has no legitimacy over other ethnic 
groups and the central government does not offer an alternative conflict resolution system. The 
growing tension between pastoralists and farmers and the lack of effective conflict resolution 
systems shows in the frequency of conflicts between ethnic groups. Between 1932-1969 there 
were two conflicts which needed resolution about grazing and water rights, between 1970-
2000 there were 27.163 This means that the environmental stress and growing tension resulted 
in more inter-ethnic conflicts and the Sudanese government fails in offering an effective non-
violent way of resolving these problems. Violence offers the only possible way out. A politically 
unstable situation and weak government institutions are the fourth reason for resource scarcity 
conflict.  
In 1989, a military coup brought Omar al-Bashir and fellow military officers to power in Sudan. 
The new elite in Khartoum was very focused on its newly gained power and was not prepared 
to share the political and economic power with other groups in society. The volatile and harsh 
economic conditions made Darfur an unstable region to govern. The new ruling elite decided 
that the best way of guaranteeing continued support in Darfur was appealing to historic and 
cultural bonds between the regime and the nomadic tribes. The leaders, of the regime were of 
Arabic descent and so were the nomadic tribes of Darfur. As the regime believed that Arabic 
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superiority would appeal to the nomadic tribes these racial superiority ideas were actively 
promoted.164 In Darfur, community confrontations and the hardening of ethnic distinctions was 
the result. In 1994, the regime decided to divide the former region of Darfur into three new 
regions, North, West and South Darfur. To make sure Darfur would pose no threat to the new 
regime, the government made sure that in every region the Fur, the largest ethnic tribe in 
Darfur, were a minority. Thus marginalizing the Fur political power and grieving the largest 
ethnic group in Darfur. In 1995 the government started to carve out Dars for some nomadic 
tribes, who were grieved for their lack of legal rights to land. What could have been considered 
a reform to protect the marginalized nomadic “Arab” tribes, resulted in enormous grievance 
and the feeling of being marginalized with the Masalit (farmers/Africans).165 A feeling not 
totally unfounded, as they were losing a significant amount of political power and territory 
formerly designated to them as Dar.166 In 1996, the government appointed eight “Arab” emirs 
in West-Darfur, an area with mostly Masalit tribes.167 Governmental actions further magnified 
the racial divide in Darfur. For example, in the mid-eighties the government provided arms to 
the Baqqara (Arab/nomad tribe) of Southern Darfur, so they could defend themselves against 
attacks of the Southern Sudanese rebels (the SPLA). Amongst raising ethnic tension it was not 
surprising that the Baqqara started to use the guns the government provided against their 
farmer neighbors.168 As a consequence of the spread of racial ideologies, economic hardship 
and the feeling of marginalization, the Arab-Masalit war (1995-99) broke out. Local conflicts 
between “Arab” and Masalit farmers eventually led to government military intervention which 
pacified the conflict but did not solve its root cause.169 
By appealing to Arabic unity and by putting the rights of nomadic tribes before those of the 
farmer tribes the government ensured the support of the nomadic tribes. For the Fur, Masalit 
and Zaghawa this meant that their political and social power was diminished in favor of the 
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nomads.170 The central government had clear stakes in racializing Darfur, and the climate in 
Darfur was receptive of racialized ideologies about superiority and historic rights to the 
lands.171 The erosion of confidence in the government is the fifth reason for resource scarcity 
conflict.172  
All this time during the eighties and nineties the regions bordering on Darfur were conflict 
ridden. In southern-Sudan you had the conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLA. 
(which eventually resulted in Southern Sudanese independence on the 9th of July 2011)173 In 
Chad, the civil-war raged, hugely influenced by involvement of America and Libya. The 
provinces of Darfur were part of the Libyan drive for unity of the Arabic states, and Libyan 
troops moved freely across the border into Darfur. The Arab-Fur war and Arab-Masalit wars 
militarized Darfur even further. The available arms and mass mobilization methods were never 
forgotten by the ethnic tribes. Because of all these conflicts Darfur was flooded with rebellions, 
militias, arms and political ideologies.174 The militarization of the Darfurians stayed, even as the 
wars ended. As Mamdani puts it: “There may have been no water, but the province was awash 
with guns”.175       
The wars and conflicts of the eighties and nineties illustrate that conflicts between the nomads 
and the farmers about grazing rights, camel theft and the access to water happened before but 
these conflicts never resulted in the systematic and ideological slaughter of one group by the 
other until 2003.176 Under enormous environmental pressure, the tribes had been in conflict 
but in previous cases this did not result in mass murder of civilians or into crimes against 
humanity. At least not on the massive scale which now make president Bashir of Sudan a 
suspect of the international criminal court in The Hague.177  
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3.3 The 2003 conflict  
In May 2000, a black book spread quickly throughout Sudan. In the months leading to the 
publication, various Darfurians, who had studied at Khartoum University, had fabricated a book 
containing state archive documents and other factual information. The black book confirmed 
with statistics and numbers what most Sudanese already knew; there was an enormous 
imbalance in the power and wealth distribution of Sudan. Three tribes hailing from the 
northern Nile valley in Sudan, who compromised 5% of the Sudanese population, had held in 
post-colonial governments more than 50% of the cabinet positions and always held the 
presidency. For the Sudanese government the content of the black book was highly 
explosive.178 The black book became the origin of the rebel movement in Darfur. Making clear 
that the government had neglected Darfur and clarifying why the rebels had a reason for their 
resentment against the government in Khartoum.179 The governing elite in Khartoum was 
reaping the benefits of control over the Sudanese state while people in Darfur were facing 
growing interethnic violence and economic hardship. As the elite in Khartoum is mainly 
concerned with dividing the wealth extracted from the Sudanian oil industry, good governance 
does not have high priority. In 2002, resentment against the government over this power and 
wealth inequality peaked.180 Harassed by the nomadic militias and without somebody who 
would take their grievances seriously; the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa organized in rebel 
movements, the SLM/A and JEM, with the former being secular and the latter based on Islamic 
grounds. Grievances caused by the neglect of the greedy ruling elite led the farmer tribes to 
start a secessionist rebellion against the central Sudanese state. In 2003 the rebels started 
attacking police posts and when unleashed, the rebels won 32 of the first 34 battles.181 It is no 
coincidence that the SLA and JEM launched their attacks when they did. The peace process 
between the Khartoum government and the SPLA in South-Sudan was drawing to a close. In the 
southern peace process, different north and south Sudanese groups were sidelined. The fear of 
the rebel groups in Darfur was that they inevitably would be sidelined even more in Sudanese 
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politics. Without legal or governing power and harassed by hostile nomads interfering with 
their lives, the Darfurian tribes were afraid that they would be even more politically 
marginalized in the new Sudanese state. As large segments of the Sudanese army were still 
active in South-Sudan, the rebels believed their guerilla movement might actually have a 
fighting chance against the Sudanese government.182 
But the governing elite did not want to be disturbed by rebels who claim neglect by the central 
government and start demanding rights and resources for their own communities. The elite in 
Khartoum is greedily enriching itself and grieved rebels who want to share in the wealth of the 
Sudanese nation are not acceptable. For the elite in Khartoum the main concern is not to 
provide the population with a just and rightful government which respects human life and 
property. The main concern of the government was the way the oil wealth of Sudan was 
divided. So the rebellion in Darfur needed to be suppressed. But the governing elite had a 
problem with the method of how the rebellion needed to be crushed. Normally the 
government would send the Sudanese army into Darfur to deal with the rebels, but in the 
Darfur case this was problematic for two reasons. First, most sections of the Sudanese army 
were engaged in South-Sudan fighting the SPLA, so the Sudanese army did not have the 
capacity to start fighting a second rebellion. Second, most of the foot soldiers enlisted in the 
military were originally from the ethnic farmer tribes in Darfur. The government feared that the 
scarce soldiers available would side with the rebel cause, and therefore the rebellion had to be 
crushed in another way. Negotiating with the rebels was unacceptable because the security 
officers behind the regime of Bashir were against concessions to another rebel movement. 
Bashir and his regime were already under pressure for giving to many concessions to the SPLA 
in South-Sudan. The government hardliners also feared the domino effect. The black book 
indicated that power in Sudan was concentrated in the hands of three tribes originated from 
the northern Nile valley. There were a lot of other tribes and groups in Sudan who have reason 
to feel neglected and marginalized. With a government centered on enriching itself, rebellions 
could easily spread in many regions of Sudan. 183  Darfur was not a region which was 
economically very valuable for the Sudanese elite but other areas in Sudan do have value. For 
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example, the Beja ethnic group controlled the access to the harbor in Port Sudan, a city in the 
North-East of Sudan. All the main oil pipelines in Sudan run from the oilfields in the South to 
Port Sudan so the oil can be shipped to consumers all over the world. The loss of the North-
Eastern territory to a Beja rebellion would mean a great economic loss for the ruling elite. 
Therefore it was very important for the Sudanian government that the message that rebellions 
will be suppressed was sent.  
 
Map 3: Ethnic tribes in Sudan and South Sudan           Map 4: Sudan Oil Fields and Pipelines 
Source:  Map 3: Michael Izady, ‘Sudan Ethnic subdivisions’, The Gulf/2000 project (3 March 2011). 
Map 4: BBC world, ‘Map of Sudan: oil fields’, Sudan: one country or two (27 May 2011). 
 
Faced with the fear of spreading secessionist movements and unable to use the Sudanese army, 
the government decided to use another way of crushing the Darfur rebellion. Siding with and 
arming the nomadic tribes, Khartoum created a cheap, effective and brutal militia, which could 
keep the Darfurian people in control. Counter-insurgency on the cheap, it costs almost nothing 
except a few weapons, gas and food.184 So the government released from prison Musa Hilal, the 
leader of one of the larger “Arab” militias. They provided the Janjaweed with air support during 
attacks on villages. And security officers freely talked, interacted and collaborated with the 
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Janjaweed.185 The attacks on the farmer villages were vicious, aimed at making life in the village 
impossible, scorched earth tactics were combined with random killings, violence and 
mutilations.186 Water was used very effective as a weapon against the civilian population. As 
illustrated with the following descriptions made by two Masalit males of the Janjaweed attack 
on their villages: “All the wells were poisoned with what smelled like DDT. Birds and animals 
that drank from the wells died.”187 Another male claimed that: “The next day someone went out 
to draw the water and found that oil had been put in the well. We could not drink the water.”188 
In a water scarce region as Darfur, water is vitally important for survival. An important strategy 
for attacking villages was poisoning the wells. By denying the civilian population access to wells, 
wadis and other water resources the attackers ensured the population had to flee from the 
area. The search for water made civilians vulnerable to attacks by the Janjaweed and made it 
easy for the attackers to isolate small groups of civilians. Especially women looking for water 
were vulnerable to rape and kidnappings.189 By stealing their water resources, the Janjaweed 
were able to capture the territories and displace the local population. The Janjaweed militia 
forces were brutal, violent and inhumane, but very effective in eliminating the base of support 
for the Darfur rebellion. 
By giving the Janjaweed free reign in the handling of the counter offense, the government elite 
secured Darfur for Sudan, even if this meant removing the largest part of the native Darfurian 
population from the area.190 The primary aim of the central government seems to have been to 
finally gain control over an area which was rife with tribes who felt neglected by the central 
government and could therefore rise up in rebellion. The combined forces of the government 
and the Janjaweed eradicated every base of support of the rebellions.191 As journalist William 
Wallis found out while visiting Darfur, “most displaced populations I came across were huddled 
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in makeshift camps. Under close government and Janjaweed control these people were too 
terrified to forage for food, let alone grow it to feed guerilla forces”.192  
The nomadic tribes were prepared to fight their neighboring ethnic groups because the large 
droughts of the eighties had led to destitution. The droughts had occurred because the rains 
were meager for several consecutive years. The water scarcity made the tribes willing to be 
used as a pawn by the Sudanese government. The tribes which supplied the Janjaweed with 
men were not the large nomadic tribes which had land concessions and dars. The fighting 
forces came forth from the small tribes which had meager political and social power and were 
hit hard by the droughts. Under the harsh climatic pressure these tribes were subjective to 
racial ideology, government propaganda and the pledge of land for their efforts. Desperate 
people are willing to do the most ridiculous things. Water scarcity created the circumstances for 
the nomads from which the government could profit. Water actually is the prize the nomads 
won by fighting the farmer tribes in Darfur. Research by development economist Olsson shows 
that abandoned Darfurian villages are increasingly squatted by “Arab” tribe civilians. The 
villages that are being squatted are located on areas which are rich in rainfall, soil quality and 
near wadis. The availability of water is one of the main reasons to settle on certain lands. Water 
rich lands are the trophy the victors received for the expelling of the former inhabitants.193 The 
government is actually actively promoting the settlement of “Arabs” on the lands of the Masalit, 
Fur and Zaghawa. Witnesses saw trucks with settlers arrive under government escort in 
Darfur.194 And there are rumors of nomads with “Arab” credentials arriving from Chad and 
occupying abandoned lands.195 What is happening in Darfur at this moment is that Fur, 
Zaghawa and Masalit tribes are in internally displacement camps in Darfur and in refugee 
camps in Chad. In their absence, their former villages are rebuilt and occupied by the civilians of 
the tribes that drove them from these villages. The mass violence ordained by the government 
makes these refugees fearful of returning to their homes and lands. The removal of the tribes 
has led to a mass redistribution of the lands, in favor of the Arab tribes. These tribes will 
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continue supporting the Bashir regime, which made the redistribution of land possible. For the 
displaced tribes this means that their chances of returning to their lands are diminishing every 
minute they are not working on their lands. Without active use of the agricultural fields, the 
land is free for the first person who claims it. As the nomadic groups are the only ones who feel 
safe enough in Darfur to work the land, the nomadic groups will settle in the abandoned 
villages.  
Because of this the Darfurian refugees are losing all hope of ever returning to their homes. If 
they are not working the fields, they do not hold legal claims to the land they used to cultivate. 
The Janjaweed are difficult to suppress, now the jack is out of the box. The Janjaweed have a 
fully-developed racial ideology, a warrior culture, weapons, enough means of transport and 
foremost: government support.196 Even if the government in Khartoum decided the Janjaweed 
needed to be stopped, this would mean an enormous task. Darfur is remote, the tribes are 
intact and will support their kin and they know the area better than any other group. The 
government in Khartoum has never had full control over the area and has been governing 
through the native administration; the situation now is no different. The government in 
Khartoum is ruling Darfur by using proxy forces to suppress rebellious ethnic groups. One might 
say they have handed Darfur over to the proxy forces to do as they like in Darfur, as long as 
they are loyal to the central government. The government in Khartoum will in all likelihood use 
the income generated by oil to buy arms and suppress every shimmer of opposition in Sudan. 
The ultimate reason for the onslaught in Darfur was therefore the central governments fear of 
losing control, not only over Darfur but also over the rest of Sudan. Any rebel will think twice 
before standing up to a government which can unleash mass-murder and violence not only on 
rebels but also on the civilian population.  
The institutions in Sudan are of a very low quality. The Sudanian institutions are biased, corrupt, 
unavailable and often in total neglect of the needs of the population. There is no conflict 
resolution system. The government is not accountable for its actions and for the population of 
Darfur there was no way to express their grievances but turning to conflict, because legal and 
democratic processes were not available to them. The low institutional quality of Darfur 
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therefore led to the Darfurian rebellion. The only response which seemed logical to the 
government was suppression of the rebellion. The most cost effective way in Darfur was using 
the Janjaweed, an extremely brutal, militia based, counter insurgency.197 The Darfur conflict 
seems to be a classic case of resource leading to conflict. A government is taking all the wrong 
decisions for the population, just so the ruling elite can keep enriching itself with the Sudanian 
oil wealth. The population of Darfur became the victim of the determination of the elite to keep 
power and share it with no-one. That said, the greed and grievance mechanism of resource 
conflict is applicable on Darfur. The central government is acting based on greed for the oil-
wealth of Sudan. The Darfurian rebels were grieved by the unwillingness of the government in 
Sudan to act on their behalf to end violence and conflict. The Janjaweed were grieved because 
they were losing the grazing lands to the expansion of farmland by the farmer tribes. Greed 
from the Janjaweed for land resulted in the expelling of the farmer tribes in Darfur and the 
change of lifestyle from nomad to farmer, which is happening at this moment. The grievances 
felt by all the different tribes in Darfur were caused by desertification and harsh climatic 
conditions. These mechanisms combined resulted in the violence in Darfur. But did water 
scarcity lead to violence? 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Wherever there is land and rain will be my homeland.198 (Darfurian migrant) 
 
Is water the main reason the conflict in Darfur happened? When looking at the facts of the 
Darfur conflict one most say no. The deliberate actions taken by the government to counter the 
rebel movement in Darfur are far more important. Then what was the role of water in the 
conflict, amidst all other factors?  
Since the big drought of the eighties water became available on a much larger scale in Darfur. 
International relief agencies, the Sudanese government and the United Nations invested in the 
installation of water points like wells, hand-pumps and dams. The efforts of these agencies 
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were very effective in providing water to the Darfurian population. Actually some studies reveal 
that the greater access to water led to an explosive rise in animal population.199 Water was 
available to the population, and although scarce, there were no specific weather shocks around 
or before 2003 that would have motivated such an outburst of violence.200 Lack of rainfall did 
accelerate the desertification of Darfur, and the land degradation that simultaneously occurred. 
But weak institutional quality has caused this resource stress to become a full-scale war. Better 
protection of land rights for nomads, cooperation between the ethnic groups on conflict 
resolution, or the option for the farmer communities to express their grievances in a non-
violent way by using the courts or through voting, could all have helped to prevent the resource 
stress from escalating into mass murder.     
The government arming and supporting the Janjaweed was a risky move. The government 
released frustrated, anxious people who were armed onto the civilian population of the farmer 
communities. The Janjaweed got the chance to take revenge on the population that was 
endangering their livelihood, and they did. With brutal and systematic methods they tried to 
eradicate Darfurian Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa life, and remove these populations from Darfur. 
Sadly, they succeeded. The Darfurian refugees currently in camps in Chad are faced with the 
fact that they are not likely able to return home. If they dare to return home they are going to 
live under a government that allowed the violence inflicted on them, have neighbors that took 
part in the killing of their loved ones and probably have civilians of the formerly nomadic tribes 
farming the land they used to live on. In other words, returning civilians have no security, no 
land and no means of living.  
If the Sudanian government had acted differently this tragedy would not have happened. So 
water is not the main reason the Darfur conflict erupted.  
But the Janjaweed might not have acted so brutally to remove the civilian population if they did 
not believe there was something to gain from the removal of the population. There was a prize 
to win, land, and by gaining this land the tribes ensured themselves of a future in Darfur. The 
nomadic tribes are currently settling on the most fertile lands left behind by the refugees. 
Abandoned land with good soil and close to wadis is the most popular area to settle on. Water 
                                                 
199
 Fadul, ‘Natural Resources’, 41-42. 
200
 Olsson, ‘After Janjaweed?’, 390. 
55 | P a g e  
 
therefore does play a role in the conflict. It is the prize the nomadic tribes gained from winning 
this conflict on behalf of the government.      
What does this mean for my hypothesis that water can lead to internal conflicts within states 
when elites try to divert the scarce water to the most easily lootable production method? The 
hypothesis does not hold in the Darfur case. The focus of the elite in Khartoum, is to stay in 
power and to derive as much wealth as possible from Sudan for their tribes. But in Darfur there 
was not much wealth to gain. The most important reason for the harsh backlash of the 
government to the rebellion was the domino effect Darfur might cause. The fear within the 
government was that another rebellion would undermine the power and income of the ruling 
elite. The harsh governmental reaction was not based on greed for Darfur, because the 
outcome of the Darfur conflict did not enrich the governing elite. It was greed driven because 
other conflicts in Sudan might impoverish the governing elite. The elite in Khartoum already lost 
the rich oilfields in the South of Sudan, they would not allow another big loss to their income. 
Even if that means they have to prove that point by acting without conscience in a remote and 
poor region. This means that the Sudanian government’s greed is not driven by the water 
availability in Darfur. But the acts perpetrated by the Janjaweed can be considered an act of 
resource greed. For my hypotheses this means that there is a second level of resource driven 
greed. The elite is only concerned with its main sources of loot. For the lower groups in society, 
in this case the “Arab” tribes the loot can consist of water. In the case of Darfur this means 
lands which have access to water. The governing elite did not care what happened in Darfur as 
long as Darfur remained a part of Sudan and the rebellion was suppressed. The elite 
“outsourced” this task to the Janjaweed who acted on their own greed driven motives. The elite 
gave a marginalized group in society a carte blanche to act as they pleased. The marginalized 
group acted out of greed for resources and grieved by perceived past injustice. This anger was 
directed against another marginalized group. If the government had provided other ways for 
conflict resolution or acted on the growing water and land scarcity in Darfur this conflict would 
not have happened. But as the government was just focused on remaining in power, water was 
redistributed in a violent way. This leads to the conclusion that water driven greed and 
grievance does play a role in the Darfur conflict. The bad institutional quality of the Darfurian 
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state is a prerequisite for this conflict. But the local actors in the conflict were driven by water. 
Water was not the main cause of the conflict because the bad institutions were the root cause 
of the conflict, but water was a factor. In the final conclusion I will present an overall conclusion 
about what this means for my hypothesis. 
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4. Case study 2: Water and conflict in China 
‘No clean official, no clean water’ (Rural Chinese wisdom)201  
 
                                                      Map 5: China 
 
Source: National Geographic, Map of China. 
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4.1 Introduction 
‘The pollution of Lake Tai has sounded the alarm for us. The problem has never been tackled at 
its root’. (Prime minister of China, Wen Jiabao)202 
 
In November 2007, environmental activist Wu Lihong was convicted to three years 
imprisonment by the court in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. Wu was charged with blackmail and 
fraud.203 He had confessed to the charges but claimed that the police had deprived him of food 
and sleep for five days forcing the confession out of him. Wu had made himself exceedingly 
unpopular with the local authorities by consistently attracting attention from the central 
government and press for the terrible pollution which was ravaging lake Tai.204 Wu was 
concerned by the fact that the fish that had lived in the streams which flowed into the lake 
were disappearing. He investigated and found that the chemical plants built around the lake 
were spilling toxic waste into the streams surrounding the lake. Wu started to protest with the 
central government in Beijing and started to inform the press of the pollution and corruption 
which endangered the ecology of Lake Tai. As Wu was a great nuisance to local authorities and 
factory owners, he was arrested on April 13, 2007. A few weeks later it became apparent that 
Wu was right about his concerns regarding Tai Lake. In the last week of May, floods of industrial 
and agricultural waste resulted in an algal bloom of toxic cyanobacteria, more often referred to 
as pond scum. The algae turned Lake Tai fluorescent green, the stench choked anyone who 
came within a mile of its shores and more than two million people were deprived of their 
drinking water source. The authorities called it a natural disaster but images of factories 
dumping toxic waste in the lake quickly surfaced.205 As the public became aware of the real 
cause of the algal bloom, the government started to take steps to prevent algae outbreaks in 
the future. The Government shut down polluting factories, banned pesticides and improved 
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sewage treatment facilities.206 But even though Wu was proven right about his environmental 
concerns about Lake Tai, he was still convicted to prison.207 The balance between local protests 
and government is delicate in China, Wu apparently crossed a line.  
Protests are becoming more frequent in China; the number of protests grew from 8.700 in 1993 
to 87.000 in 2005.208 As there is no research available which investigates all these protest-cases 
and their origin, leaders and aims, the insight into the reasons behind protests in China remains 
limited. When conducting research on how water and conflict in China are related, one cannot 
depend on large overall figures or on one conflict case as with the full scale war that happened 
in Darfur. Water conflicts in China are local conflicts that erupt across the country.209 Therefore 
this chapter about water conflict in China is based on news items and case studies done in 
scientific literature. These sources indicate clearly, that water and environment are increasingly 
the reason for conflicts to erupt in China. For example, in July 2000, farmers clashed with police 
in Shandong province in eastern China’s Yellow River basin. The farmers were protesting 
against the government decision to capture the runoff from a local reservoir, which would be 
re-used for a nearby city for industrial and domestic users. Previously, the runoff was used by 
the farmers for the irrigation of their crops and it was essential for their livelihood.210 To 
protect an essential part of their economic system the farmers protested and clashed with the 
Chinese government. Small scale water conflicts like this are happening all over China.211 
In this chapter, I first discuss the water conditions in China at this moment and how these came 
to be. Thereafter, I discuss why conflict can erupt over water in China and which conditions 
must be met for tension to become conflict. Finally, I will cover my hypotheses and discuss if 
scarcity leads to water conflict in China.  
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4.2 Water in China 
“We don't have much extra water resources. We have the same resources and much bigger 
pressure from growth.” (Ma Jun, environmentalist)212  
 
 Tabel 6: The rivers of eastern China.  
 
Source: Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Map: Rivers of China proper  
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China’s water resources are substantial in comparison with other countries, but China has a 
large population which needs to be provided with enough fresh water.213 In China, in 1997, the 
total amount of water resources was 2.220 m³ per capita; in 2030 this number is expected to 
have dropped to 1.760m³.214 Besides the fact that China is one of the most populous areas of 
the world, China is also developing rapidly. Because of the economic development, water use in 
China has quintupled since 1949.215 The great push for urbanization, industrialization and 
economic growth is pushing an already heavily taxed ecological system to its edges. The fast 
pace of development is taking its toll on the Chinese water resources. For example, the stream 
of the Yellow River had zero flow for the first time in the seventies. Over the years this problem 
exacerbated leading to zero flow for 700 km in 1997 and over the longest period, 226 days in a 
year.216 Research, into the reasons for these fluctuations and reductions, shows that human 
activity is the most important factor influencing water quantity of the Chinese rivers. Besides 
the fact that human activity has the greatest influence on river flow human influence is also 
showing an upward trend in the impact on water availability of rivers.217 The rivers are not only 
overused for consumption; a survey in 1998 found that 436 of the 532 investigated rivers were 
badly polluted and 80% of the waste water discharged into the rivers was untreated. In 1993, 
roughly 8% of farmlands received river water which was so polluted that it could not be used 
for irrigation.218 Overuse and pollution of rivers is not the only problem China faces. Over 448 of 
the 668 Chinese cities suffer water shortages, producing an annual water supply deficit of more 
than 6 billion m³. The shortages in supply have driven areas in China to overexploitation of the 
available fresh water resources. This overuse resulted in the over pumping of water supplies 
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leading to ground surface subsidence, reduced local water tables and in coastal areas in 
seawater infiltration.219  
Although industrial and domestic consumption of water is growing at a fast rate, still the most 
important consumer of Chinese water resources is agriculture.220 In northern China, the 
installation of pump wells in the sixties created a major increase in amount of land irrigated. 
Since then, there has only been a slight increase in agricultural irrigation and the total area of 
land irrigated stabilized at around 48 million hectares. Irrigation remains the largest riparian of 
Chinese water, but is in relative decline because of the diversion of water for industrial 
purposes and human consumption, especially in cities.221 In the total amount of water used by 
the Chinese the percentage for agricultural users fell from 99% in 1949 to 69% in 1998. With 
the high rate of economic growth in the 21st century this downward trend is continuing.222 
Agriculture remains the most important consumer of Chinese water, but in relation to the total 
consumption agricultural consumption is in decline.  
Especially in northern China, the water scarcity is growing. As a relatively dry area, with few 
water resources and relatively little rainfall, water scarcity is becoming a severe problem. The 
great population density and the intensive farming of north-eastern areas have always put 
heavy strains and reliance on the scarce waters of the north. But in the north this water 
shortage is amplified by the fact that the new industrial, economic and population centers of 
China are located in the area.223 Although water has always been in short supply the economic 
development is pushing northern water scarcity to its limits.224 The North China plain (Yellow 
river basin, Huai river basin and Hai river basin) represent 39% of the country’s farmland, 35% 
of the country’s population, 32% of the country’s GDP but possess only 7.7% of the country’s 
water supply.225 These numbers underpin the fact that distribution of water in China does not 
match the distribution of population and farmland. Although China is one country 
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geographically; hydrologically it has many different water systems.226 In comparison with the 
North, South-China has a more humid climate, more rivers, water is relatively abundant and not 
in short supply.227  
The Chinese government has realized the water shortage is very acute and is undertaking 
extensive water management projects to curtail water scarcity.228 For example, the waters 
surrounding Beijing are severely polluted; the waste water discharge of agriculture, industry 
and households is polluting the drinking water supply of the 14 million inhabitants of the city 
and its surroundings. To try and elevate the water shortage and pollution, the government has 
decided to divert water from the southern Chinese Yangtze river to the north of China, to the 
Huai, Hai and Yellow river basins. The annual water volume provided by this diversion should 
supply Beijing and the dry north with enough fresh water. The South-to-North water diversion 
project is one of the largest water management projects of the world and the ecological and 
social implications are enormous. 229 Next to big water development projects, water 
management has still other options available that could lead to water saving. The water scarcity 
in China could be alleviated by other economic, institutional and local choices.230 A new water 
law is under consideration that would sharply increase fines against polluters. Different coastal 
cities are building desalination plants. Multinational waste treatment companies are being 
recruited to help tackle the enormous wastewater problem. 231  (Wastewater discharge 
increased fivefold between 1984 and 1994; in 2001 only 61 percent of urban sewage water was 
treated. This wastewater is polluting the Chinese rivers.)232 According to the World Bank, 
Chinese industry uses 4 to 10 times more water per unit of production than the average in 
industrialized nations, so there are still large amounts of water which could be saved with the 
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right policy choices or technological innovations.233 But at this moment, Chinese water resource 
management is not effectively organized. There is not one government agency which is 
responsible for all the different stages of the administration of water, and water management 
projects are often of large quantity but of low quality.234 Water management in China was 
originally principally concerned with the prevention of flooding. The task of dealing with water 
scarcity and distribution dilemmas is new for the agencies and they are ill-equipped to handle 
it.235 China could save large amounts of water if the government succeeded in organizing its 
water management in a more efficient way. Water management bureaus are decentralized and 
are accountable to the local governments of different regions. This makes the national water 
policy fragmented, as the goals and ambitions of local government officials might not 
correspond with the water policy ambitions of the central government.236 Between agencies, 
there is overlap in responsibilities and there is not one department with definite and total 
authority over the water system. The government is aware of the water management problem 
and is trying to get the water management agencies better organized. But so far the 
government has not succeeded in achieving this goal. So high costs, large bureaucracies and 
administrative fragmentation constitute the Chinese water management system at this 
moment.237 The result of this disorganization is the absence of coherent and binding water 
management policy. For example, the Beijing authorities expect the upstream users of rivers to 
provide the city with enough water. This forced delivery harms the economic development of 
certain areas, as industrial development and other potential economic development 
propositions cannot be implemented because of water restrictions. Beijing offers no 
compensation for the water used, not even if drought forces farmers to relinquish their 
irrigation water to the Beijing water authority.238  
The distribution decisions are at this moment not monitored and are not made compulsory. 
This results in a free for all playground where local interests are leading in water distribution, 
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without taking the national interests or those of other actors into account. This results in inter-
regional and local conflicts where everybody attempts to gain access to the scarce water 
available. The outcome of these water management impracticalities are borne by the local 
governments, entrepreneurs and civilians. The lack of institutions and policies which regulate 
water distribution is a clear reason for Chinese water protests. James Nickum, an economist 
specialized in water and natural resources, notes that there is still a high potential for water 
savings. Water scarcity is therefore more a localized, economic and institutional problem and 
not actually the total depletion of the resource.239 
That said, the push for economic development is still the first priority of the government. Jim 
Yardley records this process in the new industrial city Shijiazhuang. Here the rate of decline of 
the ground water table is very well recorded. Wells at some places in the city have to be drilled 
to 500 meter deep to reach the ground water. The water management of the city acknowledges 
this problem and admits that with this rate of consumption the city will run out of groundwater 
eventually. But the problem of overconsumption remains, for the Chinese economic 
development is a more urgent necessity than saving water. According to a water management 
professional: “We have a water shortage, but we have to develop. And development is going to 
be put first”.240 For China economic growth is the most important issue at stake, and the 
environmental, distribution and scarcity problems of water are only considered after this 
economic growth is attained and sustained. The building of water management institutions that 
are capable of making just, thoughtful decisions which respect and balance the hydrological, 
economical, national and local interests is a low priority. In the absence of such institutions 
grand projects that divert water to water scarce areas seem to be an adequate and realistic 
solution. But eventually the Chinese government will have to give priority to water scarcity and 
make choices which will elevate the scarcity. But to achieve this the government has to create 
effectual institutions, invest in technological improvements and create incentives for lower 
governments to uphold environmental laws. 
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4.3 Water conflict 
Reservoirs and hydropower stations are sprouting up all over China, damaging ecosystems and 
causing conflict. It’s time to leave the rivers alone.241 (Feng Yongfeng, journalist) 
  
Conflicts over water are becoming more frequent in China, in 2000 there were 6.037 domestic 
conflicts over water, in 2001 there were 6.338 and in 2002 9.972; in all years eco-environmental 
cases were not included in these figures.242 In 2005 China was shaken by 60.000 pollution-
triggered public disturbances, demonstrations or riots of a hundred or more people protesting 
the contamination of rivers and farms. The Ministry of Public Security has ranked pollution 
among the top five threats to China's peace and stability. 243 The recorded conflicts are large 
scale protests and conflicts, isolated cases like the court ruling against Wu are not included in 
these figures. So what are the reasons these protest in China erupt about water? First, pollution 
of water sources by industry or agriculture. Second, redistribution of water resources to other 
users. Conflicts are erupting more often than before because of the fast pace of social and 
economic transformation. The rapid development of China into an industrialized nation is 
causing water scarcity, rising pollution and stimulated hydropower development. All these 
changes are causing transitory tension. Finally, this tension can lead to protests if a change in 
water distribution affects the allocation to one of the actors in society and this group becomes 
grieved about the new situation.244 The government has to make distribution choices about 
who gets water. With water resources over-tapped, the Chinese government is faced with the 
question which users have priority. Do the users that historically used the water have priority? 
Or do other reasons to distribute the water prevail? Does the Chinese government decide to 
provide the water to the user which can use the water in the way: that is most economic 
productive, most politically relevant or most favorable for local administrators. As the water 
management bureau is not equipped to deal with these questions nor empowered to enforce 
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its decision, there is not an overall policy which guides the local administrations when faced 
with problems about water distribution. Governmental decisions about water distribution are 
made, but the lack of effective institutions results in an arbitrary distribution process. The 
government of China cannot be considered as one single entity, different administrative units 
of the Chinese government have different priorities and goals. As a consequence, the different 
provinces located on the Yellow River have gotten in conflict with each other over the over-
tapping of the basin. Upstream provinces used Yellow River water for new industrial projects 
and to provide water to the growing urban centers. The downstream areas ended up cut off 
from their original supply of fresh water. The new consumption upstream harmed the 
downstream economic and political interests. As a result the governments of the respective 
provinces clashed and harsh words were spoken. Eventually the central government stepped in 
and ruled over the water distribution.245 But even though harsh words were spoken, the central 
government eventually ruled in this conflict and although not to the satisfaction of all parties 
involved, this ruling was accepted. The different provincial governments did not mobilize the 
army or the police force to force the other province to accept the new water distribution. The 
conflict between the Chinese provinces therefore remains political and does not turn to violent 
solutions. Water causes political friction and not violent conflict between the different 
government levels. When discussing the Chinese government position and actions it is 
necessary to distinguish which part of the government is involved as friction over water 
distribution between different governmental agencies and administrative levels have occurred.  
The reform of the Chinese economy of the past decades expanded the power of the local 
administrations. Decentralization of the government was part of the development strategy and 
therefore different departments of the Chinese government can actively pursue exactly the 
opposite goals.246 This dichotomy is beautifully clarified by Liang Congjie. When asked what the 
government thinks about his organization (Friends of Nature, a Chinese environmental NGO) 
Liang responded: “It is hard to generalize what the government thinks about us. The 
government is not a monolithic bloc in this regard. SEPA (the State Environmental Protection 
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Administration) supports us and has called us their “natural ally”. The MOWR (ministry of water 
resources) probably likes us much less and the provincial government in Yunnan undoubtedly 
hates us”.247 
Chinese history and politics scholars Perry and Selden, argue that the central Chinese 
government accepts protests as long as they are not about higher government officials and/or 
central government authority and policy. As long as the population does not attack a central 
government policy they are allowed to express their grievances by petitioning, protesting or by 
making claims in the courts. The governing elite accept protest as long as they are not the direct 
target of the grievances expressed or of the direct goals of the protest. Because of this, local 
protests about wages, pollution or other small scale grievances are acceptable if the protests 
remain local, small scale and do not cross over to other locations and social groups.248 The 
protest and conflicts that constitute water conflicts are often within this category. Political 
scientist and China specialist Andrew Mertha, investigated these local water protests and found 
that local water grievances were often expressed in a context where the local population said 
to agree with the government policy. So the rural population in Hanyuan county; grieved over 
being relocated by the new Pobugou dam, did not complain about the dam or the national 
policy of development of the west, which was the reason the dam was built in the first place. 
Initially, they complained over not being properly compensated by the local government for 
their relocation.249 The local government not only undervalued the property of the population 
which had to be relocated. The government also over-valued the land on which the population 
was to be resettled. Compensation for resettlement in China is determined by law, but fraud 
with the value of property is still possible. The local authorities were in this way pocketing a 
large amount of the compensation money which was intended for the rural population. By 
protesting the unjust compensation the local population hoped to get the support of the 
central government and eventually possibly modify the dam building plans to a less radical 
development scheme. The grievances of the local population resulted in mass-scale protests, 
where eventually tens of thousands of rural people gathered, to express their discontent with 
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the authorities. The protesters eventually achieved more compensation, but this compensation 
was still inadequate in covering the actual cost of relocation.250 The central government has 
legally codified in law the rights of the populations which have to be respected when they are 
mandatorily relocated. The local authorities profit from a relocation that is as cheap as possible 
for the local government finances. They offer the population compensation which is fraudulent, 
inadequate and below the statutory minimum. The population already grieved over relocation 
in the first place starts protesting when they realize they are not sufficiently compensated. The 
grievance caused by this infringement on their rights and the hope they have of a higher 
government level supporting their claim leads to the protests. Larson summarizes this 
mechanism as follows: “The longer the law fails, with China's business elite prospering while 
millions of farmers stand to lose everything, the closer the countryside comes to erupting into 
revolt.”251  
The Hanyuan conflict insightfully elucidates a few points about water protests in China. First, 
there is a strong dichotomy between the different levels of government. Second, when 
protesters are not attacking the central government they are allowed to protest. Third, power 
abuse by government is a strong reason for grievance with the marginalized groups in society. 
Fourth, institutional weakness led to this conflict because for the villagers there was no other 
option to express their grieve than resorting to conflict.  
The laws China has for environmental protection and water relocation are often clear enough, 
the problem lies with enforcing these laws. China has laws that shield the downstream riparians 
from upstream pollution. However, the push for economic growth and making profit often lead 
government officials and enterprises to ignore these standards and pollute streams.252 Villagers 
will not obtain justice by the hands of the people who authorized the pollution in the first place 
and receive the taxes extracted from these enterprises. To achieve that the law is actually 
enforced, villagers or urban victims have to get attention from higher levels of government.253 
                                                 
250
 Mertha, Chinese Water warriors, 65-93. 
251
 Larson, ‘China's new environmental advocates’  
252
 Hu, ‘Water conflicts’ 72-73. 
253
 Yim Yardley, ‘Rules ignored, toxic sludge sinks rural village’, The New York Times. 4 September 2006. 
ttp://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/world/asia/04pollution.html?pagewanted=1&sq=jim%20yardley,%20water&
st=nyt&scp=64 (August 2011).  
70 | P a g e  
 
To gain the attention of these bureaucrats, citizens in China have a number of non-violent 
possibilities, they can petition the central government about their grievance or sue the 
government or enterprise involved.  
The petitions written by villagers have to be handed in at the petition office in Beijing, but these 
cases are often redirected back to a local level of government for settlement.254 When their 
petitions are rejected or nothing changes for the better, villagers can resort to violence as part 
of their strategy to get their petitions and grievances taken seriously. Resorting to conflict is not 
a move quickly made. Before water problems force villagers to take action, they need to feel 
the urge to act. For this need to arise villagers need to be faced with an extreme water scarcity 
situation. For example, in Dachuan, a village in North-West China, located in Gansu province 
villagers slowly started to realize how serious the pollution of their drinking water and 
agricultural water was. They knew that their water source was being polluted by a recently built 
fertilizer factory. But before the villagers got into action, they first had to realize the damaging 
consequences the water was doing to the population. After 30 sheep and a horse went blind 
from drinking the polluted water, the villagers became scared of the human health and 
economic effects of the pollution. In China, a country with a very restrictive human 
reproduction policy, healthy children are incredibly important. The fact that in the village 
stillbirths occurred more than average was a second reason for action. These reasons, 
combined with the land degradation caused by the pollution made the villagers ready for 
protest. Their health and income were endangered by the pollution. After complaining with the 
local authorities to no avail, the villagers started to block the entrance to the factory, use the 
polluted water to hose the factory and demanded that the owners of the factory and their 
families drink the water that they expected the villagers to drink. These demonstration tactics 
were drawing attention to the problem whilst not being overly violent or showing a high level 
of civil disobedience.255 Water was the driver of this local conflict as the factory owner needed 
the water for industrial use. The local administration was greedy enough for income and 
economic growth to pay no attention to environmental laws. The local agricultural population 
was grieved by the fact that they were faced with threats to their physical and economic 
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survival. Faced with these different water priorities, water conflict erupted. Violence often is an 
effective way of not only getting attention for their grievances at a higher level of government, 
but also of forcing local party members into action.256 Local cadres and higher-level officials 
initially often reject the petition of villagers. Local cadres want to prevent intervention by a 
higher administrative unit of government, as this undermines their stature and career 
opportunities. There is nothing in China that draws the attention of higher levels of government 
more than civil disobedience by the population. Villagers resorting to conflict can therefore 
change and influence local policy. Especially if protests gain media exposure, the authorities will 
feel a need to respond by curbing the protest with violence or with concessions.257 
Protesting through media attention and/or civil disobedience is a risky business as the amounts 
of money involved gives government officials enough incentives to resort to violence if 
journalists or villagers seek to give attention to a local problem.258 Villagers try to avoid violence 
by officials against them by using peaceful protests methods. By using non-violent protests, the 
protesters believe that a higher administrative level of government will eventually support their 
claim.259 Chinese citizens have the right to petition the government. They do know that there 
are laws protecting them and believe that if a higher level of government would hear of their 
grievances caused by local administrators or companies that there will be a solution to the 
problem. But for the citizens to reach the central government with their petition they already 
have to face obstruction by local and central government agencies. How far this obstruction 
goes shows movie director Zhang Zanbo in his movie “The interceptor from my hometown”. In 
this movie the director follows his former friend and classmate who became an interceptor in 
his hometown. An interceptor has is to ensure that no petitioner from his locale reaches the 
central government agencies with petitions. The local administrators created this job because 
they are judged by higher administrators based on the amount of petitioners that originate 
from their region. Of course the lower the amount of petitioners the more positive this 
judgment, so the friend of the director uses all methods possible to prevent the petitioners 
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from reaching the central government. The director follows the interceptor while he bribes 
train conductors, isolates petitioners and forces them to return to their hometown.  
But even though petitioners are severely obstructed, the amount of petitions directed at the 
central government is on the rise.260 Environmental protests in China are becoming more 
frequent because Chinese citizens feel that they have rights and feel that these rights have 
been breached. Grieved by the fact that their rights are not upheld they resort to civil protests 
and violence, not to overthrow the government, but to force the government to uphold its own 
laws.261 
The other option open to Chinese citizens is suing the governments or companies that are 
harming their water supply. Suing can be an excruciating process that takes a long time and the 
outcome is uncertain. Being right and actually getting recognition for this fact are two totally 
different things. The institutional quality of China is so low that even if laws are evidently 
breached you do not always obtain a positive ruling in court.262 New NGOs that specialize in 
environmental cases are sprouting up in China, but their successes are mixed.263 Even if a 
positive ruling is obtained these rulings have to be enforced by local government officials. 
These are often the same officials who allowed the pollution or diversion of water in the first 
place, and are the ones profiting from it. The results can be disastrous, as in the village of Sugai, 
which was flushed with toxic waste from the spill of two nearby paper mills. What was 
disturbing about the case was that both mills had already been sued, fined and ordered to 
upgrade their equipment, after severely polluting the Yellow River two years earlier. The toxic 
spill in Sugai demonstrated that nothing was done by the local government with the earlier 
court rulings about the cleanup of the toxic waste.264  
Enforcing court rulings and environmental laws remains difficult in China. As a villager seeking 
help from an environmental law professor states, “I hope she can make the law work”.265 This is 
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a direct reason for water conflict. If Chinese laws were upheld by local administrations a lot of 
these village protest would not erupt. If the villagers could obtain positive court rulings about 
breached laws, they would not need to resort to protests. If companies knew they would be 
forced to oblige by environmental law just as their competitors, they would dodge policy on a 
much smaller scale. And if the central government would more actively check if local officials 
upheld the law, villagers did not need to try and draw the attention of the central government 
by protesting. As long as villagers do not believe that justice can be obtained through the legal 
system they will keep resorting to civil disobedience and violent solutions. If the central 
government would take the petitions of local farmers seriously, local officials would know they 
had to prevent the local population of becoming grieved by policies or actions. So as long as the 
institutional quality of China is low enough for companies to dodge laws, officials to be corrupt 
without consequences and the central government to ignore local grievances, water conflicts 
will erupt. The absence of a peaceful and successful way to express grievance results in water 
protests and violence.266 The ruling elite tries to contain and manage these local water conflicts, 
so that they do not grow in intentions or magnitude. With rural China rampant with corrupt and 
violent government officials, the countryside will prove to remain a fertile soil for protests and 
social unrest about water.267 
But the local government officials do not only fear a loss of income from lower tax revenues or 
bribes, if they start maintaining the environmental protection laws and start respecting the 
water management authorities. They also fear the central government. The central government 
is assessing the different regional authorities primarily based on economic growth. For local 
communist cadres this means that they are foremost judged based on the performance of their 
region in the economic area. The central governments pressure for growth is severe. Therefore, 
the local cadres response towards groups in society that can provide this economic growth is 
very positive. Factories, hydropower plants and other industries are facilitated if they are 
prepared to set up business in that specific locale. Environmentalist, empowered local 
populations and low ranking government officials which are undermining the economic growth 
are considered a great nuisance to officials trying to achieve central government development 
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goals. So eventually the whole Chinese society is subject to the consequences of the central 
governments drive for industrialization and development. 
But there is only one thing that the Chinese government considers more important than 
economic growth, and that is staying in power through maintaining social stability and rest. The 
first priority of the central governing elite remains staying in power.268 When the marginalized 
groups within the population dare to resort to conflict because of local grievances, the central 
government tries to contain this by ensuring that the basic rights of the local population are 
enforced. For the population this means that social unrest and conflict draws the attention of 
the central government and might reverse local government policy considered unjust. Action to 
prevent pollution and maintain water resources in a sound condition often have to be enforced 
by local protests.   
Then why was Wu Lihong convicted to prison and not protected by the central government? To 
obtain the level of economic growth, the central government’s ruling elite knows sacrifices 
need to be made. The elite knows that the country needs to deplete its water resources and 
needs its polluting industry. If China reaches the growth goals it set out to obtain, then China 
will start enforcing water saving methods and environmental laws.269 The environmental 
agency of the government is lean and overstretched; NGOs are not developed or big enough to 
deal with pollution more effectively.270 Only when the elite is faced with a direct threat to its 
authority through protests, then measures to uphold the laws of the nation are taken. And that 
is the reason why Wu Lihong was convicted. Wu was right about the breach in the 
environmental law and his concerns for the consequences of that breach. But at this moment 
economic growth is more important than the rule of law.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
What do the previous paragraphs about water in China mean for my hypothesis that water can 
lead to internal conflicts within states when elites try to divert the scarce water to the most 
easily lootable production method? Just as with Darfur, the first conclusion must be that low 
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institutional quality is a precondition of water conflicts to erupt in the first place. If Chinese 
villagers, local governments or entrepreneurs believed that the distribution of water was 
properly monitored, divided based on fair grounds, and every factory in the whole country was 
dealing with the same governmental restrictions, then water conflicts would most likely not 
erupt as easily. But as the proper institutional base for fair water management is not available 
to the population, people resort to different strategies to obtain the water they need. The 
central government creates grand water management schemes so the country remains 
hydrated. Industry ignores laws and regulation, to obtain water for cooling and the drainage of 
waste water from the factories. The industrial elite is able to do this by forming bonds with the 
local governmental elite. These connections can be based on income provided to the local elite 
by industry or the economic and political goals that are achieved because of the link between 
governing elite and industrial elite. Local governments obtain water by diverting it from other 
users; this can be other local governments or other consumers. Rural agricultural users petition 
the government or sue the government to provide water for irrigation and waste discharge. 
Domestic users are part of the drive for urbanization, development and societal rest, therefore 
the water provision to the urban users in the cities is first priority of the central government 
and the local governments alike. As economic development is the most important goal after 
societal peace and calm this means industrial users have priority over local agricultural users. 
Because there is no official government policy or decision which approves of the redistribution 
that favors the new economic profitable users over the local agriculture users, conflicts over 
water erupts. The law is clear enough, when a new user harms the water provision of an old 
user the new user should offer compensation. For rural farmers to get this law maintained they 
have to grab the attention of higher levels of government. As social rest is more important to 
them than economic growth the most effective way for the rural population to get this 
attention is through civil disobedience.     
All the different Chinese water users are in constant competition. This competition is taking 
place because there is no government agency available to mediate water conflicts. And even if 
there was an agency available this agency would have to juggle all the differing government 
priorities. So we have an elite which is focused on remaining in power and economic growth. A 
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lower or local elite which wants to remain in power by pleasing the central government. The 
method for this is ensuring economic growth. There is a private sector with entrepreneurs who 
are focused on their own personal material gains and use the possibilities provided by local 
elites for industrial development to obtain this goal. There are NGOs who are focused on 
ensuring the Chinese laws are upheld by all government levels, activists who try and provide for 
better governance and journalists who report on government and entrepreneurs breaching 
laws. The latter groups are relatively new in China and their power and room for action are not 
clearly defined at this moment, as the conviction of Wu demonstrates. And finally there are the 
groups without power, the marginalized groups, the urban and rural populations that are 
without political or economical power. These groups are looking for means to ensure laws are 
upheld and water distribution is fair and profitable for them. As the urban population is of 
eminent importance in central governmental policy this group does not have to fear the 
diversion and reallocation of their water source. But for the rural population who are not as 
important in central governmental policy their rights to water are easily breached. The only 
means of ensuring that their rights are respected is by becoming relevant to the government, as 
maintaining societal control proves to be the most important government goal. The 
marginalized rural population resorts to violence and protest as a method to get central 
government attention and support. By using civil obedience as a way to express their 
grievances, they ensure that their interests are also relevant for the governing elites.  
For my hypothesis this means that there are different levels of elites who act in different ways 
to obtain what they need. The local elite diverts the water away to the most income and 
economic or political power providing production method. The elite is doing this for self-
enrichment but also to obtain central governmental support. Both ways for diverting water are 
a form of resource greed. The central government allows this resource greed to control local 
policy because it is part of a nationwide strategy for economic development. When water 
conflicts erupt it is partly because grieved marginalized groups in a population act out of 
grievances caused by water diversion. But it is also because the marginalized groups in society 
believe the central government will support their claims. They believe that in contrast to the 
local government, the central government does not have direct financial and political stakes in 
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the distribution decision. Citizens in China believe they have rights and that the government will 
uphold these rights in the face of grave infringements. The fact that the population believes this 
leads to small scale, local and non-violent protects. This shows that the citizens of China have a 
certain fate in the righteousness of the central government. This conclusion leads to a new 
interpretation of the Douglas grid theory for water distribution in China, table 4.1. 
For China the new Douglas grid theory would look like this: 
Tabel 4.1 Description of the players in China 
Important alignment: 
Between the groups without governing or economical power 
Between the local governing elites and economical elites 
Central government forms alliances based on political or economical 
motives with both groups, depending on what serves its interests best 
 
Slowly there is a switch to upholding the rule of law by the central government because local 
protests are erupting more often and are of a greater magnitude. The central governing elite 
has to rethink how economic growth can be obtained without constantly creating grievances 
with the local marginalized populations. At this moment they let the lower administrative levels 
do the dirty work but this does not provide a solution in the long term. Institutional quality will 
need to improve if water conflicts are to stop breaking all over the country. When water 
scarcity leads to distribution decisions the governed population needs to believe these 
decisions are just. So the institutional improvements the government makes and the policy they 
not only decide to make but also actively pursue will determine if water will lead to conflict also 
in the future. At this moment water leads to local distribution conflicts as right-conscious rural 
populations try to achieve that the rule of law is upheld, as there are no effective non-violent 
methods available to them to express their resource scarcity grievances. The government is 
No-Control 
The mass of the 
governed rural civil 
society 
Reformers inspired by egalitarian 
and environmental principles  
(non-government) 
Central institutions to 
regulate affairs 
(government) 
Control 
The Urban governed 
civil society 
Industrial, commercial & trading 
interests  
(Private sector) 
Local institutions to 
regulate affairs 
(Government) 
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unwilling to crack down on these protesters but does not want the entrepreneurs to stop 
developing. Water conflicts will stop when the central government finds a way to juggle the 
interests of all societal groups. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Cases: Darfur and China 
The hypothesis of my master thesis was that water diversions of societal elites would lead to 
grievances with powerless societal groups and that these grievances would lead to conflicts. I 
studied the Darfur conflict case and the Chinese water conflict cases to test my hypothesis. In 
Darfur and in China the water scarcity is caused by overuse of the available water supply. In 
Darfur this led to desertification and in China this leads to pollution, drying of riverbeds, 
seawater infiltration and dropping groundwater tables. In both cases water scarcity was the 
outcome of a complex range of social and economic circumstances; population growth, 
industrialization, intensive farming and changing societal structures caused existing water 
consumption patterns to change and increase overall water consumption. 
But did water scarcity lead to conflict because greedy income seeking elites divert water to the 
most easily lootable production method? The answer to this question is no. In the Darfur case it 
was not the diversion of the elite that caused the water scarcity for the lower levels of society. 
In Darfur overall water consumption grew because of population growth. Water scarcity 
contributed to the outbreak of the conflict but not because of water redistribution by the elite.  
In China the government levels that divert the water are not doing this because of loot which 
can be extracted from the water. The lower governmental levels divert water because they 
have to balance various national interests. For water management to be effective and politically 
feasible it has to balance politics, economics, environmental aspects and national security. 
Water is not considered a pure economic good by politicians and people, and it often has a big 
emotional and political value. The problem in China is that central governmental policy does 
not take the maximum available water into account when economic policy is made. 
The problem in both states is that water management has no political and economical priority 
until water gets scarce. Water distribution policy is often neglected. So the scarcity is originally 
not caused by deliberate choices made to favor the elite. The scarcity is caused by societal 
overuse. But when water becomes scarce the central government is unwilling to make the 
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crucial policy choices which will determine which water user has priority. When water scarcity 
occurs the government has to make sure water consumption is reduced. The problem is not 
that the government redistributes the water; the problem is that the government does not 
officially decide to cut back consumption. In both cases water had become scarce but the 
government does not take action until the water stress escalates into conflict.  
In Darfur water scarcity led to desertification, leading to changing land use patterns which 
threatened the means of living for nomadic tribes. The central government was unwilling to 
protect the land rights of the nomadic tribes until the tribes had become so desperate and 
destitute that they started harassing their neighbors. The fact that the central government was 
unwilling to stop these harassments led to the eventual rebellion of the farmer tribes and large 
scale conflict. The Darfurian rebels believed that they would be better off without the central 
government, so they started a secessionist rebellion.  
In China the government wants to give priority to the consumption of water by industry but is 
unwilling to compensate the former water users or face the conflicts with peasants that might 
arise from this decision. So instead of making a difficult policy choice the government of China 
lets lower levels of government deal with the water scarcity, industrial growth and unsatisfied 
citizens.  
In both nations the government has no overall water policy and only acts to contain the conflict 
that arises from the immediate water shortages. In both conflict cases water scarcity led to 
local conflicts in which differing social groups are fighting to gain access to the scarce water. In 
the Darfur case this happens between different ethnic groups whom had different consumption 
patterns and different land rights. In China the conflict is between industrial entrepreneurs 
supported by the local governments on the one hand and peasants/other lower societal groups 
on the other hand.  
In both cases different societal interests clash. The conflict arises because there is no higher 
government body which will issue a verdict in a conflict case that will be accepted as fair and 
unbiased. Failing government institutions are therefore a prerequisite for water conflict to turn 
violent. If the government had implemented water policy and this policy was accepted as fair by 
the population, because compensation was given or different societal interests were properly 
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weighted, than these conflicts would have been suppressed before they erupted. Proper 
government actions might have contained these conflicts.  
This is also the main difference between the conflict in Darfur and the conflict in China. In both 
cases the local population has become grieved by the water scarcity. But in China the 
grievances can be expressed without escalating the conflict to higher levels of government. The 
central Chinese government is willing to allow protests and sometimes even meet the demands 
of the protesters, as long as the conflicts stay local and contained. In Darfur the central 
government did not listen to grievances expressed by the nomadic and farmer tribes. Instead 
when grievances were expressed the protesters were ignored, locked up or faced harassments 
by officials. Eventually the grievances escalated into a full scale rebellion by the Darfurian 
farmer tribes. In China the second step of conflict, a full scale rebellion, has so far not been 
taken by the protesters. This is because the institutional structure of China allows for 
containment of the protests to a local scale. This means the role of the local governments in 
China is crucial and these local governments have a very difficult position. They have to balance 
the central government requirements for economic growth, societal rest and local demands for 
clean water and historic water-rights. To achieve the central government requirements they 
have to provide favorable business conditions to entrepreneurs. But to maintain the societal 
calm they have to support already existing water provisions to the local population. This 
position is a difficult balancing act and often fails to achieve all requirements made to the local 
government by different societal levels. When water is consumed by other users, local 
populations become grieved so they resort to protest, as a way of obtaining their water goals. 
But as local government officials are mainly judged by the central government based on 
economic growth rates, these local officials also have to satisfy the water demands made by 
industry. When grieved by the choices made by local officials the Chinese population starts to 
protest. They have this option, and the central government is sometimes willing to reverse 
decisions made by local governments. The local population still hopes to obtain a fair ruling by 
the central government. 
In Sudan the central government was utterly disinterested in Darfur. The only aim of those in 
power seems to be to maintain that power, because through this power they have access to the 
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income generated by Sudanese oil rents. Darfur is of no particular interest except that the 
central government wants to maintain in control of all of Sudan and therefore needs to 
suppress every rebellion nationwide. So when conflict erupted between nomadic tribes and 
farmer tribes the government was unwilling to press for a settlement. Instead the government 
left the Darfurians to handle the case themselves until the unrest became a rebellion seeking 
power in the central government or secession from Sudan. From that moment on the central 
government became aware of Darfur en wanted to settle the dispute ones and for all by 
removing the rebellious population and replacing them with loyal subjects. The government 
was able to do this because of the support of the distraught nomadic part of the population. 
The Chinese government decides to contain and confront protesters much earlier on in the 
grieve process. The Sudanese government waited until the conflict escalated to a scale that 
could only be contained with massive violence. This massive violence resulted in large scale 
redistribution of land and water.  
So water was a contributing factor to both conflict cases but the systematic actions taken by 
government officials and the institutional quality of both nations was far more important. 
Therefore the conclusion of my thesis is: Water can only be a cause for a local conflict about 
distribution. For water to become a large scale conflict poor institutional quality is a 
prerequisite. Converted into tangible examples this means that neighbors can get into conflict 
with each other over the distribution of a stream that runs between their lands and this conflict 
might turn violent. This is probably how the Romans decided that rivalis, using the same stream, 
was a good way of expressing competition.  
But before a group of farmers starts protesting water diversions to industry with violent means 
they must believe the diversion ruling is unjust and that the government is unfair. Competition 
over water is more of a local issue, to escalate into higher government levels the institutional 
quality must be poor. In China the conflict resolution systems forestall the escalation of conflict 
into large scale rebellion. In Darfur a large scale rebellion was the only escalation possible for 
the farming tribes who were harassed by nomads (the nomadic tribes were facing water but 
most of all land scarcity). The central government always resolved these small scale conflicts in 
favor of the nomadic tribes. The large scale farmer rebellion that followed was secessionist and 
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therefore threatened the Sudanese central government. The government had ignored previous 
smaller scale conflicts, or was not able to solve the conflict to the liking of those concerned. In 
China the government is able to contain the water protesters in an earlier stage of the conflict. 
One of the main fears of the central Chinese government is a large scale rebellion reminiscent 
of Tiananmen Square. To prevent this fear from becoming reality, rebellions and conflicts are 
resolved before their goals become national. If protesters start attacking central government 
institutions and policy, the containment policy did not work. So to prevent escalation the 
Chinese government tries to resolve conflicts as early on in the conflict as possible.  
The conclusion of studying both conflict cases therefore is: Changing social or economic 
circumstances like population growth, industrial growth or climatic degradation can cause 
water stress. But water stress only causes local small scale conflicts. Before local water conflicts 
lead to large water conflict other factors are a prerequisite. Water stress needs to be combined 
with: poor water management policy, low quality government institutions and a government 
not accountable to public with non-violent means. Therefore water can only be the contributing 
factor for conflict. The low institutional quality of the government and other authorities is the 
main reason for conflict to erupt within a nation. Surprisingly although the economic, political 
and societal factors in China and Darfur differ to a great extent, the same conclusion is 
applicable to both cases.   
 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
What does this conclusion mean for my theoretical framework?  
The prize which can be gained by winning or maintaining access to water differs highly 
according to the economic and societal situation. In Darfur having access to water makes 
survival possible for people living in harsh climatic conditions. In China access to water can 
mean the difference for a local administrator between stagnated economic conditions and 
rapid economic growth. The access to scarce water represents a certain value, but because of 
these different conditions between different societies, groups act according to their water goals. 
If a group becomes marginalized in society this powerless group can have no other option than 
violence. This violence might be triggered because otherwise the elite will redistribute the 
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water to the disadvantage of the powerless group. Water scarcity might emphasize the impact 
of already existing societal differences in like ethnic cleavages and skewed distribution of land, 
wealth and/or power. But if groups were not politically or economically powerless in the first 
place they would have non-violent options to express their grievances.  
Violence might also be triggered because water scarcity becomes water stress without the 
additional redistribution on which my hypothesis was based. In Darfur the powerless group did 
have access to water but was grieved about a lack of political rights. In China water is often not 
redistributed but polluted which harms the use of farmers but does not officially cut of farmers 
from water. My hypothesis that the elite will redistribute water to other groups in society 
therefore is incorrect.   
In chapter 2 I stated the following about my hypothesis: The state is based on a coalition of 
different groups in society. For hierarchists to secure themselves with the base they need to 
maintain in power, they have to provide individualists/entrepreneurs with the income they 
demand. If a change in the base situation leads to scarcity, redistribution decision have to take 
into account how the hierarchists try to keep their base of power intact. As water resources 
become scarce, greed for the water will lead groups to try and attain as much of it as possible, 
herewith providing for their own income. As marginalized groups in society are faced with elites 
diverting the water, transitory tension within society arises. When the state is not receptive to 
the complaints of the marginalized farmers, no other option is left open to these farmers than 
conflict. In this way water scarcity can lead to conflict. With other words I describe how I 
thought water loot was going to be redistributed among supporters of the state and how the 
state would get into conflict with marginalized groups.  
But the fact is that in Darfur and in China the water distribution decisions are not made based 
on which societal group supports the state the most. In Darfur the most bereft of water were 
the nomadic tribes who did support the central Sudanese government. They started harassing 
their neighbors because of land and water scarcity. Eventually the farmer tribes escalated the 
local conflict to a national level and the outcome was that the scarce water was redistributed to 
the nomadic tribes. But this redistribution happened after water scarcity led to conflict. The 
redistribution in itself did not lead to conflict.  
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In China the redistribution of water to industry is mostly a way for the central government to 
attain the economic goals set for different local areas. The redistribution is not based on the 
fact that entrepreneurs/industrialists are more vehemently supporting the state, they are a way 
for the state to obtain their own goals. This means that my hypothesis about water considered 
as loot should be rejected. Water does not seem to be important enough for higher levels of 
government to redistribute. The total lack of water management exemplifies this. But it might 
be a trigger factor for local actors, the Janjaweed in Darfur expelling the farmer tribes and low 
level administrators available for bribing by entrepreneurs. Water can be a local cause for 
conflict because local actors might be greed driven for water. The central government does not 
really mind who gets the water, as long as the group is supportive of the central government. 
The farmer tribes in Darfur were and the local protesters in China are safe as long as they do 
not attack the central government. But on a local scale water can lead to greed driven conflict 
and the redistribution of water. The price the Janjaweed won because they fought the war for 
the Sudanese government was water rich territory. For local administrators in China a polluting 
factory can mean the difference between promotion or demotion. The main question for future 
research is which loot/rents can be extracted from water and how these rents interconnect 
with the outbreak of water conflict. How come the income generated by water is only 
important for local actors and not for higher government levels? And can the right government 
policy prevent these local conflicts from erupting? Because local actors can be driven by water 
greed and local conflicts therefore can be triggered by water scarcity. But can the water greed 
of local actors be prevented with the right institutions? I believe this is also the case on a local 
level. Even on a local level water can only lead to conflicts if other factors are contributing.  
For example, if I owned a piece of land in the Netherlands and an entrepreneur would want to 
build a factory next to my land, I would have other ways to express my grievances. If I was a 
farmer and expected that the factory would start polluting my water supply I would first protest 
with the local government about the building of the factory. Then if the factory was approved 
by government officials and indeed build, I would want to be financially compensated for my 
loss of income. If the factory was build and I was not compensated I would write the factory 
owner and the local government’s environmental agency about upgrading the factory’s water 
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purification systems. And if that did not solve the polluting then I would sue the company in 
court. If all the above would not lead to a solution to my problem I would be severely frustrated 
and might turn violent. But I believe the Dutch government would not allow a polluting factory 
to take away my source of income without proper compensation. So before water 
redistribution turns violent people must not have any other option left to express their 
grievances. Therefore even if an actor on a local scale does need water for survival, even on a 
local scale the actor only turns violent if institutional quality is low.    
  
5.3 Further research 
Having answered the question does water lead to conflict within states, I now come to the 
other topic of my thesis. Is a theory originally based on resources applicable for water? Is the 
framework of the resource curse thesis applicable to water conflicts? First I most note that 
there is a large hiatus in the resources and conflict research when resources do not provide 
large rents or other lootable income. The only research into this topic is the research into if 
abundance in agricultural produce leads to conflicts within states. More quantitative research 
into the connection between conflict and non-lootable resources must be done before the link 
between resources and conflict can be firmly established for resources that do not generate 
easily monitored rents or loot. But for my research the tools and methods provided by the 
research into resources and conflict were very useful. The theory systematized the large topic 
which I studied and provided much needed insight into how conflicts erupt. The framework of 
resources and conflict with the grievance and greed mechanism is very applicable to water 
conflict. Because of these systematizations it became clear that the higher levels of government 
do feel greed, but this greed is not focused on water but on the other sources of income. This 
shows that if conflict erupts between higher levels of government and local people other 
factors than water must come into play. The theory therefore makes it easier to distinguish 
between drivers of the conflict and contributing factors. Water does have a large emotional 
dimension but by studying water scarcity with the insights of the water and conflict theory one 
must note that this emotional dimension is mostly rhetoric or serves as motivation whilst other 
more important reasons are the true causes for conflict. Water is just not important enough for 
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higher government bodies and elites to get into conflict. Therefore the base for water wars 
theory, that water scarcity will lead to conflict is baseless.  
For future research I suggest a large scale quantitative research into how non-lootable 
resources that become scarce interconnect with the outbreak of conflict. Which factors can be 
seen in all nations that are faced with resource scarcity and conflict. In China and Darfur these 
connecting factors are weak conflict resolution systems and the absence of government policy 
that would diminish the effects of the water scarcity or contain these effects. These weak 
institutional qualities are essential for the outbreak of the conflicts in both nations.    
 
5.4 Summarization of conclusions 
• For water conflict to erupt bad-institutional quality is a pre-condition  
• A change in water distribution can cause conflict but these conflicts are local  
• The eventual scale of the conflict depends on the elites reaction to the conflict 
• Water alone is not important enough to cause internal conflicts  
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